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ABSTRACT
This study attempts to survey and analyze the various
problems relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons
and the future of the nonprolif eration regime. Nuclear pro-
liferation is the intersection of a number of important
issues, none of which individually will decide how events
will unfold.
The growing number of nuclear power industries through-
out the world has led to the widespread availability of the
necessary nuclear technology and fissile material used to
construct nuclear weapons. Therefore, the capability is
increasingly becoming available to many national leaders.
Second, the motivations for a country to "go nuclear"
could change rather suddenly in an international system
which is plagued by a greater fragmentation and diffusion of
power
.
This study finds that the present fragile nuclear non-
proliferation regime is inadequate to limit the spread of
nuclear weapons, thus the world is gradually moving into a
period in which it may soon contain from 15 to 20 nuclear
states. And the danger will be all the greater that a brush-
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The subject of nuclear proliferation always provokes a
strong reaction. While most analysts believe the world will
be a more dangerous place with the spread of nuclear weapons,
a few argue that more nuclear weapons may actually lead to a
more stable international system. For better or worse, a
lesson of history is that by increasing the number of states
or actors with any type of weapon, the chance is greater
that someone will use them.
Proliferation, as applied to nuclear weapons, may be of
two types, either "vertical" or "horizontal." Vertical pro-
liferation is the numerical increase in the number and/or
size of nuclear weapons within a state's arsenal, such as
the United States or the Soviet Union. Horizontal prolifer-
ation is an increase in the number of states who possess, or
may possess in the future, a nuclear capability. This study
focusses on horizontal proliferation, which adds to the in-
stability that characterizes a multipolar international
system.
Nuclear proliferation alone is not going to exacerbate
the dangers of a multipolar world. A state becomes a great
power only by combining economic, military, social, politi-
cal, and geographic assets in more effective ways than other
states. Great Britain, France, and China have had

significant nuclear arsenals for years without altering the
basic bipolarity of the international system. The addition
of Israel, Brazil, Pakistan, or even numerous other states
to the "nuclear club" is not going to automatically create
an additional pole.
The international system is extremely sensitive to rapid
changes, therefore an actual or perceived situation such as
nuclear proliferation seemingly out of control would create
instability in the international environment. Great effort
must be made to ensure changes of this nature do not occur.
The prospect of more nuclear states should not necessar-
ily be of concern, but an accelerating rate of change in the
number of nuclear states could be a great danger to the
world. An exponential growth rate in the number of nuclear
states would cause general restraints to break down and deci-
sions to forbear would be reconsidered because "everyone is
doing it."
Widespread nuclear proliferation would alter the politi-
cal interests and attitudes of most countries and would
change dramatically the international politcial environment.
For example: The number and diversity of countries and sit-
uations of strategic concern would be multiplied; the poten-
tial destructiveness of regional wars would be increased;
the requirements for defense, security, and alliance strat-
egy would be reviewed by many nations; and finally the funda-
mental concepts of international relations could be affected
10

If ten to fifteen new nuclear states emerge in the next
twenty years, the conceptual framework for dealing with such
a situation will certainly be inadequate. In the past, mis-
calculation and faulty analyses have occurred over and over
again, contributing to numerous wars, alarms, and crises.
Much to the chagrin of national leaders throughout the world,
there have been many unanticipated coups, revolutions, and
unexpected actors of which former National Security Advisor
Brzezinski lamented: "the intelligence community provides
many facts but few findings."
The real problem of nuclear proliferation is that numer-
ous countries are drifting upward to higher categories of
competence. Manufacturing a nuclear bomb is not a simple
basement operation, but neither is it an overwhelming or
mysterious technical feat. It requires scientists with an
understanding of the fundamental precepts of nuclear energy,
a cadre of engineers, and a supply of fissionable material.
(Fusion weapons will not become practicable in the near
future for most countries.) More and more countries are
moving toward all three, therefore proliferation will depend
more upon political decisions and less upon technological
progress. This means that any transient incentive or pres-
sure in the ebb and flow of world politics which would influ-
ence a country to build nuclear weapons at some point in the
future will just be that much easier to act upon.
11

This thesis is based upon the hypothesis that nuclear
proliferation, irrespective of its "goodness" or "badness"
is inevitable and will be "explosive" in nature, that is to
say, many countries will acquire nuclear weapons in a rela-
tively short period of time.
Given the importance of the subject, it behooves all
actors to seek a slow, steady, and calculated progression
toward further proliferation. Mankind simply cannot afford






The science and technology that produced atomic electri-
city have also created the most horrible instruments of
destruction the world has ever known. Possibly the greatest
paradox of history is the ability to produce peaceful and
unlimited energy as well as unlimited death and destruction
by the same process.
The development and dissemination of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes present an inescapable dilemma: How does
one guard against the dangers of proliferating nuclear wea-
pon capabilities while advancing the benefits of the atom
when the basic technology for both is largely the same?
Some believe the answer to this dilemma lies in the hope-
ful words of William Shakespeare, "out of this nettle, dan-
ger, we pluck this flower, safety." Regardless of where
the answer lies, seeking this duality of purpose has always
been at the heart of U.S. nonproliferation policy.
On the military side, the question has been how to avoid
or reduce the dangers of the proliferation of nuclear arsen-
als. With this in mind, the three wartime allies involved
in the Manhattan Project— the U.S., Great Britain, and Can-
ada—agreed that the establishment of effective internation-
al safeguards against military applications of nuclear power
should precede any diffusion of nuclear technology and
13

materials for nonmilitary purposes. In line with this tri-
partite policy they proposed a commission on atomic energy,
within the framework of the United Nations, for a reliable
2
safeguards program aimed at eventual nuclear disarmament.
A. BARUCH PLAN
In an attempt to find answers to the nuclear question,
Secretary of State Byrnes established a study committee in
January 1946. To serve on this committee, Byrnes appointed
Dean Acheson (chairman), Vannevar Bush, James Conant, John
McCloy, and General Leslie Groves. Acheson appointed David
Lilienthal, a Harvard Law graduate and director of the Tenne-
see Valley Authority, as chairman of the board of consul-
tants. Their job, as seen by Lilienthal, was to build a
knowledgeable policy on questions of control, safeguards,
enforcement, and international competition. Lilienthal once
stated
:
the work of this group for which I have been made chairman,
is to develop a position based on facts not now known by
our political officers, that will work, and have a good
chance of being accepted, especially by Russia.
The group considered the alternatives, rejecting some
and setting others aside for further attention. Lilienthal
asked at one meeting if a prohibition against all nuclear
development may be the only way to save the world from an
eventual nuclear holocaust. The response was predictable.
They were simply too excited by the commercial and
14

humanitarian prospects of atomic development to accept that
the best control may be one that prevented all use of nuc-
4lear energy.
President Truman appointed Bernard Baruch as his repre-
sentative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission
(UNAEC) . In a dramatic speech before the U.N. on June 14,
1946, Mr. Baruch outlined the proposals of the U.S. for the
international control of atomic energy. He stated that,
"we are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead
. . . We must elect World Peace or World Destruction ..."
He continued:
The United States proposes the creation of an Interna-
tional Development Authority, to which should be entrusted
all phases of the development and use of atomic energy,
starting with the raw material and including
—
1. Managerial control or ownership of all atomic-energy
activities potentially dangerous to world security.
2. Power to control, inspect and license all atomic
activities.
3. The duty of fostering the beneficial uses of atomic
energy.
4. Research and development responsibilities of an
affirmative character intended to put the Authority in
the forefront of atomic knowledge and thus enable it to
comprehend, and therefore detect, misuse of atomic
energy
.
When an adequate system for control of atomic energy,
including the renunciation of the bomb as a weapon, has
been agreed upon and put into effective operation and con-
dign punishment set up for violations of the rules of con-
trol which are to be stigmatized as international crimes,
we propose that
—
1. Manufacture of atomic bombs shall stop;
15

2. Existing bombs shall be disposed of pursuant to the
terms of the treaty; and
3. The Authority shall be in possession of full infor-
mation as to the knowhow of the production of atomic
energy.
He went on to stress that the punishments for violations
were not to be subject to veto in the Security Council.
Baruch basically accepted the Acheson-Lilienthal report
as American policy except for the two issues mentioned— sanc-
tions against violators and the desire for no veto in the
Security Council. He was of the opinion that world peace is
impossible without force to sustain it. Consequently, he
insisted that any plan for control of atomic energy contain
a provision for sanctions and removing the veto from the
Security Council. Acheson disagreed but President Truman
did not.
The Baruch Plan was preordained to fail. Nuclear disar-
mament and the development and dissemination of atomic
energy for nonmilitary purposes were locked together in the
U.S. proposal and conditioned on the prior establishment of
effective controls and safeguards against military applica-
tions. The Soviet Union's counterproposal was a commitment
to nuclear disarmament ahead of any international control
and verification machinery. From the Soviet viewpoint, the
U.S. would always retain at least a technological military
superiority if they accepted the Baruch Plan.
16

Furthermore, as Khrushchev later said,
What would it have meant to put the development of atomic
energy under U.N. control? That would have meant to put
it under control of the U.S. inasmuch as the U.N. in
point of fact, is a branch of the U.S. Department of
State."
The Soviets were adamantly opposed to any system of
international inspection, control, and punishment; they re-
fused even to consider surrender of the veto, protesting
that this did violence to the national sovereignty of the
Soviet Union. In essence, during this period Stalin was not
about to open Soviet borders to the Western world and expose
their tremendous economic and military weaknesses.
For over two millenia nations have not voluntarily sur-
rendered their sovereign prerogatives and this issue remains
the unbudgeable obstacle to arms control and disarmament.
While the prospects of opening U.S. borders for Soviet in-
spection were widely entertained in Washington in 1946, the
g
same was not true in Moscow.
B. ATOMS FOR PEACE
Failure of the Baruch Plan, as viewed by many in the
U.S., was partly due to the inward-looking Atomic Energy Act
of 1946 (McMahon Act) . It provided for civilian control of
the Atomic Energy Commission, government ownership of all
fissionable materials and related production facilities, and
placed a veil of secrecy over industrial research and devel-
opment. Also under this act Great Britain and Canada,
17

wartime collaborators in the Manhattan Project, were denied
9
any exchange of nuclear information.
No serious disarmament negotiations were possible during
the Korean conflict; in fact Great Britain exploded its
first atomic bomb in October 1952, the U.S. its first hydro-
gen bomb in November of the same year, and in August 1953
the Soviet Union exploded its first hydrogen bomb.
Because of these events, President Eisenhower recognized
that the U.S. policy of strict secrecy and no information
exchanges on potential peaceful benefits actually decreased
whatever chances that existed for the establishment of some
international safeguards. Also, the political, economic,
and scientific interests in the U.S. pressed for pursuing
cooperative relationships, under safeguards, with select
countries. The peaceful commercial uses came to be regarded
not merely as an end in themselves but also as a means of
shifting interest from the military to the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy.
On December 8, 1953, President Eisenhower presented the
U.S. "Atoms for Peace" proposal to the U.N. General Assembly
He outlined the dangers of atomic weapons and acknowledged
that several nations already possessed them and eventually
many others would have them too. Secretary of State Dulles,
during his testimony before the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy in 1954, summarized the prevailing view.
18

Knowledge in the atomic energy field was growing in so
much of the world that the United States could not effect-
ively dam the flow of information, and if we try to do it
we will only dam our own influence and others will move ,q
into the field with the bargaining power that it involves.
While the idea of effective safeguards and controls was
not forsaken, it definitely was relegated to a lesser posi-
tion than the promotion of civil uses of atomic energy domes-
tically and internationally. In the words of Willrich and
Taylor
,
Atoms for Peace signaled a major reordering of priorities.
Prior to 1953, international control came first and peace-
ful nuclear development second. Thereafter, development
came first and international inspection and control second,
if at all. 11
The "Atoms for Peace" proposal led to a considerable ero-
sion of the line between the peaceful and the military uses
of atomic energy. It facilitated the spread of nuclear tech-
nology and nuclear materials, yet it reduced the safeguards
necessary to prevent the diversion of fuel to making bombs.
For implementation of this new U.S. policy, the Atomic
Energy Act of 1946 had to be changed. Congress passed the
new Atomic Energy Act in 1954 and this act authorized a
program,
to encourage widespread participation in the development
and utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes to
the maximum extent consistent with the common. defense and
security and the health and safety of public.
On March 19, 1955, President Eisenhower created the Cabi-
net position of Special Assistant to the President for Dis-
armament and named Harold Stassen to fill the post. The
19

President later gave Stassen negotiating as well as planning
power
.
In July 1955, at Geneva, Switzerland, President Eisenhower
made another effort in arms control. Looking directly at
Communist Party First Secretary Khrushchev, he outlined an
"Open Skies" proposal that called for a swap of both mili-
tary blueprints and of flights by the planes of one nation
across the territory of the other. Americans at the time
feared a "nuclear Pearl Harbor" and the Open Skies proposal
was the reaction to the growing Soviet nuclear stockpile and
the limited American knowledge of the Russians* nuclear
13delivery capability.
As with the Baruch Plan, it appeared to the Soviets that
the U.S. was again trying to gain an advantage. There exis-
ted neither a conjunction of political interests nor the
equally necessary balance of military power to make agreement
3 4possible.
The most positive development of the period was that the
"Atoms for Peace" program eventually led to the formation of
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) , which entered
into force on July 29, 1957. The IAEA safeguards initially
were not applied universally, nor to all of a country's nuc-
lear facilities, but only to a limited number of specific
facilities and a small fraction of the fissionable material
in the world. This was later strengthened by the nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty that entered into force on March 5,
20

1970. The safeguard system shall be discussed further in
Chapter III in conjunction with the NPT.
The U.S., the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China
specifically developed nuclear weapons first and were only
interested in peaceful uses secondarily; swords into plow-
shares. France and India have developed nuclear explosives
from advanced peaceful nuclear programs; swords from plow-
shares. The latter experience is the greatest fear for the
future.
C. PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY
On March 14, 1954, a fishing boat named the "Lucky
Dragon" returned to Japan from a trip to the South Pacific,
where they had been exposed to radiation from a U.S. nuclear
explosion test. Nearly all of the crew had come down with
nausea, fever, bleeding gums, and other classic symptoms of
radiation poisoning. It was confirmed within a few days
that the crew indeed were suffering from radiation sickness
caused by the U.S. test. The people of Japan, remembering
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, refused to be reassured by U.S. offi-
cials and demanded that the U.S. conduct a formal inquiry.
The alarm felt by the Japanese people soon spread to the
U.S. and the U.S. President did not help the situation when
responding to a reporter's question:
it is quite clear that this time something must have hap-
pened that we have never experienced before, and must have
surprised and astonished the scientists.
21

Of course the press had a field day with the President's
reply and many people throughout the world speculated that
the nuclear test had somehow gotten out of control.
Throughout 1955, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) con-
ducted an intensive public relations campaign designed to
convince the American people that the fear of fallout was
groundless. While the AEC tried to quiet public fear over
fallout, a far-reaching debate broke out within the scienti-
fic community. Biologists provided the real scare when they
suggested that fallout created a genetic danger for the
human race. Professor C. H. Waddington, a Scottish geneti-
cist, summed up the prevailing consensus when he wrote:
any atomic explosion which produces an increase in radio-
activity, however small, in regions inhabited by man will
add something to humanity's store of newly mutated and
most harmful genes.
These pessimistic assessments obviously did not go unchal-
lenged, but the psychological damage had already been done.
Scientists failed to arrive at a clear consensus, but
a majority seemed to feel that the dangers to human life
were slight. The need for more information on the effects
of radiation on human life was one area on which all scien-
tists seemed to agree.
Within the context of the Cold War strategic doctrine of
"Massive Retaliation," it was clear that the Eisenhower ad-
ministration faced a real dilemma: How to continue to test
and manufacture nuclear weapons in the face of such contro-
versy about fallout and the effects on the human race?
22

Even in the face of strong public support for a test ban,
President Eisenhower and his special assistant Stassen were
opposed to the idea. Eisenhower indicated he was more inter-
ested in a comprehensive disarmament proposal than a piece-
meal approach. "I see nothing to be gained," he declared,
"by pretending to take bits of items of that kind and deal
with them separately." For the moment, at least, the ad-
ministration appeared to be unyielding in its commitment to
a policy of conducting nuclear tests which it felt were
vital to U.S. security. In so doing, the AEC announced a
new series of atomic tests scheduled for late spring and
early summer of 1957.
Eventually, though, world pressures required action by
the nuclear states. Three developments occurred at the 1957
London session of the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commis-
sion of the United Nations that set the stage for the Geneva
test ban negotiations. The first of these developments was
the announcement by the Soviet Union that it would allow con-
trol posts on its territory to minitor any agreement for the
cessation of nuclear weapons tests. In conjunction with
this announcement, the Soviets also declared their desire
for a two- to three-year suspension of tests. Both of these
announcements were dramatic changes from the past. Prior to
this date, June 14, 1957, the Soviets had accrued consider-
able political benefits proclaiming to be the leader in pur-
suing a nuclear test ban and for various reasons had not
23

seen a need to seriously negotiate. Now the situation had
changed.
The second development which contributed to the Geneva
negotiations is that the Western nations had also altered
their position during the course of the London session.
They stated they would agree to a temporary suspension of
testing while the control system was established and Stassen
also hinted they might accept a loosening of the tie between
the test ban issue and other measures of disarmament. This
change of heart was a complete reversal of previously stated
policy.
The final development during the London session which
had a bearing on the Geneva negotiations was the introduc-
tion by the Western delegation of the idea of holding techni-
cal talks on control systems. Although the Soviets eventu-
ally rejected the idea of technical talks, it was important
for later negotiations that they were introduced here and
18did gain some legitimacy.
The partial test ban treaty was the end result of some
five years of intensive though intermittent negotiations.
They began in 1958 and moved through a tangle of proposals
for both comprehensive and partial test bans.
After President Kennedy's inauguration, a new emphasis
was placed on achieving a comprehensive nuclear test ban
treaty. Kennedy was personally convinced that, on balance,
a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty was in the best
24

interests of the U.S. and ultimately would lead to reduced
world tensions. This feeling could have emanated from the
ill-conceived notion that a comprehensive test ban would
prevent nuclear proliferation; a country cannot develop a
nuclear arsenal if it cannot test weapons.
Even though the Soviets would accept command posts on
their territory, it was clear by mid-1962 that they would
not accept any proposal that involved on-site inspection of
otherwise unidentifiable underground events by foreigners.
Later in August 1962, the U.S. delegation introduced
into the negotiations two draft treaties, one a partial and
one a comprehensive ban. On July 2, 1963, Premier Khrushchev
made his reply. Although he decisively rejected a comprehen-
sive test ban treaty with on-site inspection, he did agree
to a partial nuclear test ban treaty in three environments
—
outer space, the atmosphere, and under water—with the use
of existing national verification systems. The treaty was
19formally signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963.
Excluded from the treaty were those nuclear tests car-
ried out underground and considered by the U.S. to be unde-
tectable without on-site inspection
—
provisions unacceptable
to the Soviet Union.
The pact did not include measures for disarmament and
did not bind other nations. But hope was expressed that the
treaty would serve as a step toward disarmament and eventu-
ally would be accepted by all states. President Kennedy
25

thought the greatest value of the treaty would be in the
precedent set, as "a shaft of light cutting into the
darkness.
Without deprecating the positive aspects of the Partial
Test Ban Treaty (?TBT) , it is important to point out its
deficiencies. First and foremost, France and China have not
signed or become parties to the treaty. Not only were they
not parties, they actually conducted atmospheric tests dur-
ing the test ban negotiations. Fourteen other countries
including Argentina and Pakistan have signed but not rati-
fied it. Second, the treaty contains a withdrawal clause
whereby a party can withdraw from the treaty by giving three
months' notice, if it decided that extraordinary events have
jeopardized its supreme interests. Most important here is
that this was the first time that a withdrawal clause had
been included in any arms control treaty. Now withdrawal
clauses are standard practice. The political liabilities
would not be nearly so great for withdrawal from formal
treaty obligations as would outright disregard. Third, it
was widely accepted that the PTBT would actually stop devel-
opment of new and more sophisticated nuclear weapons and
actually halt nuclear proliferation. Nobody predicted that
underground tests would exceed previous atmospheric tests;
nor could anyone foresee how underground testing coupled
with sophisticated computer technology could provide a loop-
hole for the development of an entire range and class of new
26

weapons. The emergence of China, France, and India as nuc-
lear powers, not to mention numerous other states that are
on the verge, demonstrates the futility of attempting to
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In human history, tragedy or near-tragedy has often been
necessary to motivate man to higher ambitions. Efforts
between 1945 and 1963 aimed at the control of nuclear weap-
ons basically ended in failure. But unexpectedly in October
1962, a series of events began that led to numerous achieve
ments which we now call the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
This regime is centered around the Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) and the IAEA safeguards system.
The Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 clearly demon-
strated to the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. that the avoidance of
nuclear war between them was a necessary condition for their
mutual survival. Second, in 1964, they both were jolted by
a Chinese nuclear explosion. Third, by 1965, it had become
clear that numerous other countries— India, Japan, the FRG,
Sweden, Italy, Israel--were on the threshold of becoming
nuclear powers.
President Kennedy expressed his dire concern over the
nuclear proliferation problem during his report to the
nation on the nuclear Test Ban Treaty:
We have a great obligation— all four nuclear powers [China
had not yet detonated its first device] have a great obli-
gation—to use whatever time remains to prevent the spread
of nuclear weapons, to persuade other countries not to
test, transfer, acquire, possess, or produce such weapons. 1
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In essence, these events had significantly altered the
political environment toward a policy of nuclear nonprolifer-
ation. Some concurrence of political objectives coupled
with a cooperative spirit on the part of both superpowers
led to limited yet cumulative nonproliferation achievements.
A direct communication link— the "hot line"—was estab-
lished in 1963 between the heads of governments in Washing-
ton and Moscow for use in time of emergency Also in 1963,
the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) was concluded and entered
into force.
In 1967, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weap-
ons in Latin America, known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, was
completed (and has been signed by twenty-two states of the
3
region). This treaty contains three distinct provisions:
1. Prohibits the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the
contracting parties.
2. Prohibits the receipt, storage, installation, deploy-
ment, and any form of possession of any nuclear weap-
ons, directly or indirectly by the Parties them-
selves, by anyone on their behalf, or in any other
way.
3. Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) will not use or threaten
to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting
Parties.
Although not all pertinent parties have been able to
accept all three provisions, the Treaty of Tlatelolco has
proved to be a positive aspect of the nonproliferation
regime. It has also encouraged other states to pursue such
4
a treaty in their respective area of the world.
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Also in 1967, the Outer Space Treaty was completed and
entered into force. Contracting parties agreed not to place
nuclear weapons in orbit around the earth, nor to install
them in celestial space.
The question of safeguards for nuclear nonproliferation
agreements has always been an important and difficult issue.
Although the machinery for safeguards has been intact since
the formation of the IAEA in 1957, it has never been fully
utilized
.
On June 13 1968, the U N General Assembly passed the
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and with it a directive requir-
ing all signatories to the Treaty to commence negotiations
with the IAEA concerning safeguards for their nuclear
activities
.
During negotiations on the NPT, an argument emerged
between the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and the Non-Nuclear
Weapons States (NNWS) concerning the nature of the relation-
ship between the arms limitation and security policies of
the major states and the acquisition of independent nuclear
weapon capabilities by additional states. This argument
diminished the viability of the NPT from the very beginning.
Conditions leading to a soon-to-be onslaught of nuclear
powers are amassing quickly in this high-technology, con-
flict-ridden world of today. The limitations of the NPT and
the incomplete nature of the IAEA safeguard system has made




The origins of the NPT treaty are found in an Irish
draft resolution, submitted on November 17, 1961. This reso-
lution called upon all states, particularly those possessing
nuclear weapons, to secure an international agreement under
which nuclear states would agree not to relinquish control
of nuclear weapons nor to transmit information necessary for
their manufacture. Non-nuclear states would agree not to
manufacture or otherwise acquire control of them. This pro-
posal was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly on
December 4, 1961. Sweden suggested that, in addition, the
Secretary-General inquire under what conditions NNWS might
be willing to bind themselves not to seek nuclear weapons
in the future. Reciprocity was mentioned most often as the
condition under which governments would adhere to the treaty
Also in 1961.. the U.N. General Assembly formed the new
negotiating forum for disarmament— the Eighteen-Nation Com-
mittee on Disarmament (ENDC) . It was to be comprised of the
nuclear powers and some of their respective allies, as well
as eight nonaligned NNWS that were to represent every region
of the world. This Committee, meeting in Geneva, henceforth
became the main forum for the deliberations over the NPT.
From 1963 until 1965, little progress was made because
of the U.S. plan for the establishment of a NATO multi-
lateral nuclear force (MLF) . The Soviets viewed this scheme
by the U.S. as contrary to the principle of nonproliferation
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and accused the U.S. of trying to promote nuclear prolifera-
tion within NATO while preventing it in the rest of the
world. The Soviets did not want the West Germans to have
control of nuclear weapons.
Early in 1965, the political atmosphere had changed and
sustained negotiations upon the NPT commenced in earnest
within the ENDC and continued until the treaty was concluded
in June 1968. The NPT was opened for signature on July 1,
1968.
In November 1965, the U.N General Assembly passed Reso-
lution 2028, sponsored originally by the eight non-aligned
NNWS in the ENDC, which summarized the main principles which
the NNWS argued should guide subsequent negotiations on
nonproliferation:
1. The treaty should be void of any loop-holes which
might permit nuclear or nonnuclear Powers to prolifer-
ate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any
form;
2. The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of
mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear
and nonnuclear Powers;
3. The treaty should be a step towards the achievement of
general and complete disarmament and, more particular-
ly, nuclear disarmament;
4. There should be acceptable and workable provisions to
ensure the effectiveness of the treaty; and
5. Nothing in the treaty should adversely affect the
right of any group of States to conclude regional
treaties in order to ensure the toal absence of nuc-




Basically, NPT negotiations evolved through five dis-
tinct stages. In each sta,fce, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. submit-
ted draft treaties while the NNWS submitted criticisms and
counterproposals. Eventually the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. sub-
mitted joint draft treaties to meet the criticisms of the
NNWS. Landmark dates for the beginning session of each
stage were: August 1965; August 27, 1967; January 18, 1968;
March 11, 1968; and May 31, 1968.
2. Negotiation Issues
Throughout the negotiations, the two major questions
at issue between the NWS and NNWS were deliberately and thor-
oughly discussed.
a. Arms Limitation and Disarmament Measures
Fundamentally, the NWS were opposed to tying
related arms control and security measures to the NPT while
the NNWS argued that the NPT was inextricably linked to such
measures
.
In the August 1965 draft treaties, neither the
U.S. nor the U.S.S.R. incorporated any arms control or dis-
armament measure other than the non-dissemination of nuclear
weapons by NWS and the non-acquisition of nuclear weapons
by NNWS.
The three NWS that were sponsoring the NPT nego-
tiations (U.S., U.K., U.S.S.R.) argued adamantly against
linking arms control measures with the NPT First they ar-
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gued that progress in arms control and disarmament must be
cumulative and failure to reach an agreement on the NPT
would negate previous efforts in this area, such as the
PTBT . 8
Second, the three NWS claimed that nuclear pro-
liferation was intrinsically dangerous to the stability of
the internatioanl system, but nuclear proliferation was par-
ticularly dangerous to the NNWS because hostile neighbors
9
may eventually exercise a nuclear option.
Third, the NWS argued that the NPT negotiations
were extremely complicated and tying the NPT to a package
of related measures would only ensure stalemate and ultimate-
ly make an agreement impossible. In particular, both the
U.S. and U.S.S.R. referred to the difficult questions of con-
trol and inspection which would be raised if the NPT was
tied to other arms control and disarmament measures. As a
matter of fact, this issue became so difficult that on
August 24, 1967, after intensive secret negotiations, "they
(U.S. and U.S.S.R.) submitted separate but identical drafts
in the ENDC, leaving blank the article that was to embody
the inspection provision."
Fourth, the NWS reasoned that the NPT was a pre-
condition to arms control and disarmament measures since:
the United States and the Soviet Union are understandably
very unlikely to begin to dismantle their own armouries
while the possibility of what has been called 'horizontal'
proliferation still exists "
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The NWS and NNWS mainly disagreed as to whether
the NPT should be made contingent upon arms control and dis-
armament measures or whether the NWS should be obligated
merely to undertake negotiations on such measures.
Without going into all the criticisms surround
ing this aspect of the negotiations, it is important to note
that India, Sweden, Burma, Mexico, and Brazil were able and
capable leaders in the development of the NPT.
It became clear to the NWS that many NNWS expect-
ed progress on this issue and not merely a promise by the
NWS that they would negotiate. To meet the objections pre-
sented by the NWS, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. submitted a revised
joint draft treaty to the General Assembly which included an
additional amendment in the preamble "to undertake effective
13
measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament." The
NWS also revised the accompanying draft resolution to stress
effective measures of , rather than steps toward nuclear arms
control and disarmament.
In the final analysis, it was apparent that the
treaty's sponsors were unable to enjoin upon themselves that
which they expected of the NNWS. The nuclear powers viewed
their own security needs as requiring the continued testing
of nuclear weapons, and considered obligatory steps toward
their own nuclear disarmament as non-negotiable . In addi-
tion, the problem of nuclear proliferation would be defined
in terms of "horizontal" rather than "vertical." Numbers of
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Because of the Chinese nuclear detonation in
October 1964, the problem of extending security assurances
to non-nuclear signatory states to the NPT became a matter
of great concern. The NNWS had come to feel that accession
to the NPT was a sacrifice for which compensation had to be
obtained in the form of security guarantees from the NWS.
Security proposals ranged from a call for
general and complete disarmament to the Swiss-Romanian
proposition:
that nuclear states were to promise, formally and solemnly
never to use nuclear weapons nor threaten to use these
weapons against states which did not possess them and
which undertook not to manufacture them.
President Johnson assured NNWS that they could
be sure of U.S. support against any form of nuclear black-
mail. In the 1966 ENDC session, Premier Kosygin stated the
U.S.S.R. desired to include in the NPT a statement prohibit-
ing the use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear signa-
tory which did not have them on its territory.
Obviously, NNWS desired negative security guaran-
tees of the Kosygin variety, but because of NATO's inability
or desire to match Soviet capabilities in Europe, the Kosygin
posture was unacceptable to Western leaders. After all,
NATO's deterrent strategy is based upon rapid escalation to
tactical and ultimately strategic nuclear warfare.
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After much debate, it became apparent that many
NNWS sought iron-clad obligations from NWS, which for vari-
ous reasons they were unable to commit. Since a certain im-
passe was developing, it was proposed that a U.N. resolution
be passed rather than an article to the NPT concerning secur-
ity assurances.
On June 19, 1968, the Security Council approved
(10 to 0, with 5 abstentions) a declaration which stated:
1. That aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of
such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State
would create a situation in which the Security Council,
and above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent mem-
bers, would have to act immediately in accordance with
their obligations under the United Nations Charter;
2. Welcomes the intention expressed by certain States
that they will provide or support immediate assistance,
in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-
weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Prolif era-
tion of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act or
an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear
weapons are used;
3. Reaffirms in particular the inherent right, recognized
under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and col-
lective self defense if an armed attack occurs against
a member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain inter-
national peace and security."
This device has been widely criticized as being
meaningless, partly because each of the overt nuclear powers
is now a permanent member of the Security Council and has
veto power there. Moreover, there is no prospect that the
nuclear signatories of the NPT would commit themselves uni-
laterally or multilaterally to the assistance of the non-
nuclear powers in general; even within alliances, the
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credibility of nuclear guarantees is perpetually in doubt.
DeGaulle used this argument in the 1960s while pursuing a
thermonuclear capability.
B. STATUS OF NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
The important aspect concerning the status of the NPT
is that two of the NWS have not signed it and most of the
threshold NWS have either not signed or ratified the treaty.
(See Appendix B.)
C. NPT SAFEGUARDS
The IAEA was first created by the superpowers in 1957,
then bypassed and virtually ignored. For several reasons
the existing safeguards system of the IAEA was deemed inade-
quate for the purpose of the NPT. Therefore a Safeguards
Committee was set up by the IAEA Board of Governors in April
1970 to propose the structure and contents of the agreements
to be concluded between the IAEA and the NNWS to the NPT.
The IAEA Board of Governors approved the Committee's recom-
mendations of April 20, 1971.
The question of safeguards is of central importance to
the NPT. Article III of the Treaty (Appendix A) establishes
the framework within which safeguards, specifically those of
the IAEA, are to operate. Under the Treaty, the IAEA is
given the responsibility of providing safeguards for ensur-





For an NWS either to transfer nuclear weapons physically
or to give technical information concerning their manufac-
ture to NNWS would be a violation of the NPT, but there is
no provision for safeguards against this type of violation.
Thus, it is important to remember that the safeguard system
maintains checks only on places where nuclear material is
reported to be present by the host country; a limited part
of the nuclear spectrum.
Considering that the world's nuclear reactors will be
producing thousands of kilograms of plutonium per year by
1990 (See Table I) and only 10 kilograms are required to pro-
duce a weapon, it is important for us to understand exactly
what the present safeguard system does cover and, more im-
18portantly, what it does not cover.
1 . Function and Objectives
Prior to the NPT, only a handful of countries had
safeguards through individual agreements, so the meeting in
Vienna in 1970 offered a rare opportunity for all the par-
ties concerned to review together the basic philosophy, as
well as the detailed procedures for implementing such a
system.
There are some distinctions between the Statute of
the IAEA and the NPT safeguard system that should be pointed
out.
The IAEA Statute does not require any member of the Agency
to submit to safeguards (except insofar as the state








Country 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Argentina 350 1,228 2,898
Austria 1,324 3,059
Belgium 1,272 4,953 9,858
Brazil 85 866 3,591
Bulgaria 711 2,291 3,871
Canada 90 1,665 4,938 14,283 27,075
Czechoslovakia 75 358 1,984 3,639
Denmark 324 1,134
Egypt 216 756
Finland 294 1,997 3,877
German Democratic
Republic 51 170 1,188 2,838 4,488
German Federal
Republic 277 1,657 7,621 21,638 38,927
Hungary 632 1,422
India 18 402 1,032 2,424 4,204
Iran 1,242 5,022
Israel 108 648
Italy 485 935 1,941 6,099 10,774
Japan 74 1,460 10,126 23,671 35,915
Korea (Republic of) 281 1,951 6,081
Mexico 56 1,111 2,221
Netherlands 8 153 628 1,103 1,578




South Africa 513 2,220
Spain 12 588 2,613 4,562 16,836
Sweden 212 3,169 9,244 15,629
Switzerland 5 622 1,671 6,366 11,371
Taiwan 206 1,961 6,241
Yugoslavia 555 1,110
SOURCE: SWORDS FROM PLOWSHARES by Albert Wohlstetter , 1977
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the Agency) , nor does it require that states make their
international assistance or transf ers subject to the reci-
pient's acceptance of such controls.
The NPT simply builds on the framework created by
the IAEA Statute. The NPT:
1. Requires all non-nuclear-weapon parties to submit to
IAEA safeguards by means of agreements to be negoti-
ated with the Agency by these states, either individua-
ally or collectively, within specified time limits.
2. The NPT prohibits any party from supplying to any non-
nuclear-weapon state (whether or not it is party to
the Treaty) certain types of nuclear items for peace-
ful purposes, except subject to IAEA safeguards . 20
Although the NPT is less specific than the Statute
as to the control measures, it supplies two provisions lack-
ing from the Statute. First, an obligation to submit to
safeguards, and second, a requirement that most international
transfers of nuclear material or equipment be subject to
controls.
In accordance with the NPT agreements, the Agency
performs its duties by concentrating on strategic points in
the nuclear fuel cycle. These points are selected in such a
way that entire plants or parts of plants can be monitored
as self-contained units. The use of material accountancy
is the fundamental NPT safeguards measure and they are ap-
plied in such a way that, in effect, they verify the find-
ings of the state's own system. Verification rights include
the use of locks, seals, cameras, television, and other auto-
matic devices, as well as inspections.
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In sum, the basic objective of the NPT as set forth
in Article III is:
to prevent the diversion by a non-nuclear weapons state
of fissionable material from peaceful uses to nuclear weap-
ons or other nuclear explosive devices;
and if this diversion dees take place,
to provide timely detection of diversion of significant
quantities of nuclear materials from peaceful nuclear acti-
vities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other
nuclear explosive devices, or for purposes unknown. 22
2. Effectiveness
A detailed description and analysis of the IAEA's
safeguarding responsibilities are beyond the scope of this
work, which is concerned with the assessment of the effec-
tiveness of the international safeguards system in prevent-
ing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The NPT safeguards system has many drafting limita-
tions which could be characterized as intrinsic weaknesses.
The mere fact that an international safeguards system exists
is encouraging , but safeguards alone cannot insure success
of the nonproliferation regime. Without discussing all of
the system's problems, it is crucial to understand its major
limitation.
a. India's nuclear explosion was declared by the
Indian government to be a "peaceful nuclear experiment," and
that they had no intention of developing nuclear weapons.
The material used in the explosion came from a research reac-
tor (outside IAEA safeguards) constructed under an agreement
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with Canada. This agreement specifically stated that any
nuclear material from the reactor would be used for peaceful
purposes only. What is the difference between a peaceful
nuclear explosion and a nuclear weapon? The technology is
exactly the same, therefore the distinction can only be in
. . . 23the mind of the initiator.
As a result of this incident, Canada unilateral-
ly imposed strict export regulations on Canadian nuclear
materials hoping to prevent any additional "peaceful nuclear
experiments" and further embarrassments.
As commendable as this action was, even the most
strict regulations can be evaded.
A country that is not party to the NPT can build
its own research or power reactor using natural uranium or
thorium ore or it can acquire its own supply of plutonium if
it buys or builds a small reprocessing plant. Only the NPT
requires that all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear
activites of NNWS be placed under international safeguards.
If one thinks this is beyond the capabilities of
NNWS, one only has to look at Table II. Not only have the
majority of nuclear threshold powers not signed and/or rati-
fied the NPT, many already have a separation capability.
South Africa even has an enrichment facility.
b. It is clear from the wording of Article II of
the NPT that the manufacture of nuclear weapons or explosive
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manufacture is allowed. Since industrial activities are
technically indistinguishable from military activities,
violation would be difficult to prove.
In the nuclear fuel cycle, there is what is con-
sidered a "normal" amount of nuclear "material unaccounted
for" (MUF) . MUF can be as much as two percent, and with
present technology cannot be accounted for in terms of abso-
lute amounts. This would be desirable since bombs are made
from absolute kilograms of fissionable material rather than
from a percentage of something. The U.S. and U.K. have ad-
mitted to the disappearance of significant amounts of pluton-
ium. The best one can hope to attain with safeguards is
a varying degree of suspicion.
c. Although Article III of the NPT refers to the
IAEA Statute and safeguards system, it is not explicitly sta-
ted that NNWS party to the Treaty shall accept the IAEA safe-
guards as such. Remember, the IAEA itself is not a party to
the Treaty and therefore has no legal basis.
25For commercial reasons, Euratom maneuvered for
months hoping to substitute their own safeguard system for
that of the IAEA as fulfillment of Article III of the NPT.
Ultimately Euratom agreed to verification but it set a dan-
gerous precedent.
d. The U.S. and other supplier states have contin-
ued to provide source or special fissionable material and
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equipment to NNWS not party to the NPT, without insisting
on international safeguards.
While this is legally not a violation of the
Treaty, it is obviously a mockery since it grants more favor-
able terms to non-parties than parties.
The 1974 secret "London Suppliers Club" meeting
made a faint attempt at resolving this problem. The loop-
hole that remains still allows for diversion, if a state so
desires, because NNWS not party to the Treaty continue to be
subject to fewer safeguards than parties. NNWS party to the
Treaty must submit all their imported nuclear materials to
IAEA safeguards while non-parties must submit only future
supplies. Thus indigenous or past imports are free of safe-
guards. This situation clearly does not provide an incen-
tive for states to sign or ratify the NPT.
e. Know-how in any form is not covered by NPT safe-
guards. The "supplier club" also produced a "trigger list"
that somehow was supposed to resolve the export-import safe-
guard problem. Any item on this list that was exported by
a supplier state would supposedly automatically activate the
safeguard system.
In reality, many of the supplier states have
been unable to accept the political commitments necessary
for this arrangement to work. Some states continue to sell
"heavy water," capable of producing high-grade plutonium
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without requiring safeguards. "Clearly, commercial competi-
ng
tion has often taken priority over political wisdom."
f. Safeguards for state-of-the-art technology have
yet to be implemented. "Breeder" reactors, as their name
implies, create more fissionable material from the source
material. For safeguards to just keep pace with their pres-
ent limited scope they will need to be applied in such a way
that they "pursue" the fissionable material from generation
to generation. Otherwise the safeguard system will become
even less useful.
When President Carter attempted to slow the com-
mercialization of the breeder technology, he soon discovered
powerful commercial opponents throughout the worldwide nuc-
lear industry. Essentially, he was unable to slow the pace.
g. Maybe the most serious problem concerns the
actual physical security of the nuclear material, which is
left exclusively to each state, and not subject to interna-
tional safeguards. Physical protection of international nuc-
27lear transfers is also left to the states concerned.
From the standpoint of the future spread of capa-
bilities to make nuclear explosives with a short time delay,
it is trends in the Materials Accounted For (MAF) that are
likely to be decisive. The basic data on the special nuc-
lear materials that are owned and controlled by national
governments are not assembled and reported. Safeguards deal
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with material that conceivably may be diverted and MAF does
not qualify.
Moreover, the IAEA interprets its mandate as
foreclosing any report on the size, physical state, and iso-
topic and chemical composition of any stocks of special nuc-
lear material present and accounted for, not to report those
missing and unaccounted for at specific facilities, except
to a very narrowly circumscribed set of staff members of
IAEA. Basically, there has been little analysis of trends
in such accounted-for stocks. Attention, in short, has been
on the minute amount that is unaccounted for and not on the
99 percent or so that may present the most important problem,
For the formation of timely and precisely adapt-
ed actions to inhibit the spread, the regular publication
and analysis of trends in stocks of fissionable MAF is
extremely important.
The early proponents of the idea of making plu-
tonium safe by contaminating it with stable higher isotopes
(denaturation) were ambivalent and troubled by the substan-
tial technical shortcomings of the notion. But they clearly
grasped an essential fact of international safeguards which,
though reasserted from time to time, has a way of getting
lost in international and national bureaucracies. That be-
ing, a safeguard involves more than simply detecting a viola-
tion of an agreement; it implies detecting the approach by
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a government to getting a bomb in time for other governments
to do something about it.
The hopes for a denaturing of plutonium that
would compel isotopic separation were disappointed. However,
chemical separation has remained as a barrier for plutonium
that takes a substantial amount of time to surmount and any
interpretation of safeguards that removes this barrier, thus
leaving practically no warning time, should be recognized as
abandoning the essential purpose of safeguards.
If the critical time to make an explosive is al-
lowed to shrink to a few weeks, days, or hours, there will
not be enough time for political or military action.
In sum, no existing international authority has
the power to enforce NPT/IAEA safeguards. If national gov-
ernments cannot or will not prevent diversions, then clearly
an international authority will not be allowed to interfere
in a state's sovereignty. Alerting the world community of
states of a breach or suspected breach is about the best
that can be said of the safeguards system.
The greatest danger for further nuclear prolifer-
ation stems not so much from an inherent deficiency of the
NPT/IAEA safeguards but from the capabilities and attitudes
of the nuclear threshold states that have shunned the NPT.
These dangers have nothing to do with the adequacy or inade-
quacy of the safeguard system but are bound up in a
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country's views concerning its security, and these are
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IV. AVAILABILITY OF TECHNOLOGY AND PLUTONIUM
There are, broadly speaking, two approaches to stemming
proliferation. The first is technical: keeping the where-
withal to make bombs out of the hands of NNWS. The second
is political: ministering to the fears and suppressing or
appeasing the aspirations that propel states into the
nuclear club.
The NPT proposed a complete change in the system that
had governed nuclear technology transfers. The pre-NPT
safeguards involved a willingness on the part of the recipi-
ent state to accept an abridgement of its national sover-
eignty in order to receive the commercial benefits of an
international nuclear transfer, whereas the NPT safeguards
system represented an intolerable infringement of the princi-
ple of national sovereignty as embodied in international law
As stated earlier, the NPT safeguards system included the
whole range of a nation's peaceful nuclear activities, even
those indigenously developed. Prior to 1968, concern over
peaceful nuclear development had merely been an adjunct to
the wider debate over international security and disarmament
issues; after 1968, questions of peaceful technology trans-
fers acquired a momentum of their own.
A country cannot acquire a serious peaceful atomic capa-
bility without moving to the brink of nuclear explosives.
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President Johnson obviously failed to fully understand this
premise when he promised to "share our technical knowledge
and experience in peaceful nuclear research fully and with-
out reservation."
If a date were to be set that marked when world opinion
suddenly became aware of the relationship between civilian
power plants and weapons proliferation, it would be May 18,
1974. On that day, India exploded a nuclear device that was
made from fissile material from its Cirus reactor in Trombay.
The explosion demonstrated that, given a modicum of techni-
cal skill, any nation could use fuel from nuclear power
plants to fabricate weapons. It further showed that external
assistance (in this case, from Canada) could help develop
the technical skills needed for such an undertaking. Final-
ly, the explosion also gave support to the view that it was
now more urgent than ever to add the signature of each nuc-
lear energy consumer to the nonproliferation treaty.
Countries that have responded to the energy crisis by
establishing a civilian nuclear industry may soon be in a
position to manufacture weapons components and then quickly
acquire the necessary nuclear material from their reactors
whenever they feel the international situation would seem to
warrant full-scale production.
The civilian nuclear programs now operating assure that
many countries have travelled a long way down the path to a
nuclear weapons capability. In many cases, the remaining
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distance will be short enough to mean that even a rather
small impulse might cause a government to produce nuclear
weapons, and that decision may provide enough reason for
others to go nuclear. This would present a new and danger-
ous instability for the international system.
Technical innovations coupled with widespread familiar-
ity with the necessary technology to acquire nuclear weapons
could lead to this very situation. Relatively unsophistica-
ted nuclear devices and conventional aircraft may be suffi-
cient to provide assurance of narrow strategic objectives,
2
not to mention possibly millions dead.
The cost of acquiring such a nuclear force would vary
depending on the nature of the force desired and the level
of nuclear and related technological development already
attained. Therefore, when examining Nth country weapons
options, the standards of the five NWS should be set aside.
Critical to understanding why the current nonprolifera-
tion regime will in all likelihood deteriorate significantly
in the next fifteen years is a clear comprehension of the
technology involved and recent U.S. policy toward the spread
of this technology. If this technology continues to spread
unchecked, eventually the main fissionable material, pluto-
nium, will become available to numerous countries in rela-
tively large quantities. Once plutonium is available, the
only "fire break" between NWS and NNWS is the political deci-




Until pure, or fission-free, fusion explosives become
practical, any nuclear program requires fissionable materi-
als. Three types of materials can now be used as core mater-
ials for nuclear explosives: uranium that is highly enriched
in the isotope uranium 235 (U-235) , plutonium 239 (Pu-239)
which can be made by capturing neutrons in uranium 238
(U-238) , and natural uranium 233 (U-233) . None of these
"weapons grade" materials exist naturally in significant
... . 3quantities.
The actual construction of a nuclear device is no longer
the main concern of those wanting to prevent proliferation
of nuclear weapons. That scientific knowledge is now widely
disseminated, even to the general populace. The major obsta-
cle to a country or a group of private individuals is the
acquisition of the fissionable material necessary for making
fission bombs. There are several options.
1. Build a uranium isotope enrichment facility for con-
verting domestically available natural uranium to
highly enriched uranium.
2. Build a natural uranium reactor using domestic or im-
ported uranium, domestic or imported heavy water, and
high purity graphite or beryllium for slowing down neu-
trons sufficiently to sustain a chain reaction, and
build the reprocessing plant necessary to extract plu-
tonium from the irradiated fuel.
3. Build a high energy charged particle accelerator, simi-
lar to some that are now used for basic high energy
physics experiments, to produce neutrons, by bombard-
ment of ordinary uranium, that are subsequently cap-
tured to make plutonium.
58

4. Build a reactor that used nuclear fuel material sup-
plied by another country, and use some of the fresh
fuel, if it contains highly enriched uranium, pluton-
iura, or U-233 that is not effectively safeguarded.
Otherwise, also with the condition that the reactor
is not effectively safeguarded, extract plutonium or
U-233 from spent fuel at a domestic, unsaf eguarded
fuel reprocessing plant.
5. Obtain a reactor, or assistance in building it, from
another country, and exercise the appropriate one of
the two options referred to under point 4. The second
of these was apparently the option used by the Indian
government.
6. Obtain a nuclear reactor and/or nuclear fuel from ano-
ther country, and if the nuclear materials are effect-
ively safeguarded from diversion for use in nuclear
explosives, abrogate the agreement at some later time.
7. Arrange for the theft of weapons grade materials from
another country where physical security measures
applied to the materials are inadequate.
8. Arrange for the theft of weapons grade nuclear mater-
ials from facilities that are within the country and
subject to safeguard agreements, but in such a way
that the theft appears to be the work of a criminal
group without any connections with the government.
9. Arrange for the theft of complete nuclear weapons from
another country.
This list is not exhaustive, but each item is a credible
option under the right circumstances.
Options 4 through 9 are basically political decisions
and are presently outside the nonproliferation regime which
is based, first on adherence to the NPT and its associated
safeguards, and second, however naive, on the hope that hones-
ty exists in international relations. Option 3 is presently
economically unsound for most threshold nuclear states and
also somewhat of a political option, since any country
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building a high-energy charged particle accelerator would
be suspect. Options 1 and 2 are economically feasible and
would also be extremely beneficial in a country's nuclear
energy program. Therefore, the efforts of adherents to the
nonproliferation regime have been aimed toward preventing
the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology.
1. Enrichment Technology
When a country considers nuclear power systems for
its energy needs, it must consider the economics of the
entire nuclear fuel cycle. The potential buyer must be
assured that it can either buy enriched uranium fuel direct-
ly or contract separately for natural uranium, uranium con-
version services, uranium enrichment services, and fuel fab-
rication services. The availability of these services is
obviously important. In light of the Carter administra-
tion's policy of attempting to restrict access to these ser-
vices (to be discussed in more detail later), concern that
there could be a world-wide shortage of enrichment capacity
has developed. Because of this, a number of nations may
decide it is both feasible and desirable to have their own
enrichment capacity, so as to ensure fuel supplies for power
reactors.
The feasibility of acquiring enrichment plants has
been increased by recent technological developments.
During most of the nuclear age, concern about nuc-
lear proliferation focussed on plutonium as the fissionable
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material for weapons rather than on U-235. Mainly, this was
due to the widespread belief that separating plutonium from
the other products would be much easier and less expensive
than obtaining uranium sufficiently enriched in U-235 to be
useful for an explosive device.
Recently there have been developments that have al-
tered this situation, and possibilities on the horizon may
be even more dramatic. There are several alternative tech-
niques that have been developed to the point where they are
certainly more economical than the extremely expensive gas-
eous diffusion method
—
particularly if it is to be highly
enriched (See Table III) . Highly enriched uranium is the
best material for nuclear weapons.
a. Gas Diffusion
This is the most common method of enrichment.
It is based upon the fact that lighter molecules in a gas
move faster than heavier molecules, and thus strike the con-
tainer walls more often. If one of the walls has holes
large enough to let individual molecules through, but not
large enough to permit bulk passage of the gas, more of the
lighter molecules than the heavier molecules will pass
through the barrier. By this device it is possible to in-
crease slightly the concentration of lighter molecules in
the gas.
Gaseous diffusion plants are necessarily very
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plants are expensive and therefore will not be an attractive
way for smaller countries to acquire fissile materials. Gas
diffusion technology therefore allows for the control of pro-
liferation by the virtue of the fact that expense restricts
the number of states that could construct these facilities
indigenously. However, the commercial availability of small-
er, less-expensive enrichment processes could make this type
of proliferation control obsolete.
b. Gas Centrifuge
This process entails separating hexifloride mole-
cules by pumping the uranium hexafloride into a centrifuge
and allowing the lighter 0-235 isotopes to diffuse toward
7the center for collection.
The electricity consumption of a centrifuge is
considerably less than that of a gaseous diffusion plant,
but is relatively expensive and therefore will prooably not
present a great proliferation danger.
c. Becker Nozzle
This is an aerodynamic process and may prove
attractive in special circumstances.
The basic design of the Becker nozzle is that
uranium hexaflouride gas, mixed with hydrogen, is blown at
high velocity around a curved track. The heavier moledules
tend to go to the outside, and the enriched U-235 is separat-
es
ed into an inner flow.
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Since this process does not require expensive
rotating machinery or sophisticated permeable barriers, it
will in all likelihood be much cheaper to operate. South
Africa has a pilot plant using the Becker nozzle design and
Brazil is scheduled to receive one from West Germany.
d. Laser
There are presently two types of laser tech-
niques. One uses visible wavelength lasers to excite in
U-235 a sequence of energy transitions in a stream of neu-
tral uranium metal vapor, while the other technique uses an
infrared laser to excite a molecular resonance of the U-235
9
component of hexafluoride gas.
Although there are difficult problems yet to be
solved, it is likely that laser enrichment will be demonstra-
ted on a commercial scale before 1990. There are two dis-
tinct advantages over the other process: (1) the possibil-
ity that power requirements will be very low, and (2) the
possibility that a high degree of enrichment will be reached
in a single stage.
The laser process will cause highly enriched
uranium to be more readily available for possible weapons
production. At present, the situation in the enrichment mar-
ket is characterized by the predominant position of the U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE) which, apart from the capacities
of Technabsexport (USSR) that are available to the Western
world, is almost the exclusive supplier of the West. But
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during this decade other suppliers such as EURODIF (Italy,
France, Spain, Belgium, and Iran), URENCO (West Germany,
Netherlands, and Great Britain) , COREDIF (France and Iran)
,
and PNC (Japan) will soon be producing and selling sizeable
amounts of enriched uranium.
Enrichment is a vital but economically small com-
ponent of nuclear power programs; nations are thus likely to
construct or purchase their own plants rather than submit to
a potentially unreliable and politically motivated supplier.
Nations can now easily obtain their own plants and be capa-
ble of producing fuel with enough U-235 to make nuclear weap-
ons. Countries can do this under the guise of promoting and
developing their peaceful nuclear programs allowed by the
NPT.
Because of its potentially serious impact on pro-
liferation, laser technology should be tightly controlled
and extensively safeguarded.
2. Reprocessing Technology
Nuclear reactors produce not only electricity but
also plutonium. Unfortunately, from the nonproliferation
viewpoint, reprocessing has a number of nonmilitary justifi-
cations. Denial of reprocessing by a country would mean
foregoing both plutonium recycle (which could meet approxi-
mately 15 percent of fuel requirements for LWRs in the fu-
ture) and fast-breeder reactors (which use plutonium fuel)
.
While there are problems associated with both plutonium
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recycle and fast breeders, current nuclear power industry
forecasts include the expansion and spread of reprocessing
technology, equipment, and facilities. (See Table IV.)
Spent fuel reprocessing offers a major source of
fissile material in a period when the known deposits of com-
mercially useful uranium ore may soon be exhausted. At
the same time, it also increases the risks of weapons prolif-
eration because of the possibility of plutonium extraction
during reprocessing.
There are several different techniques to perform a
chemical separation: All have as their goal the separation
of plutonium and uranium from the other materials.
The Purex process is the main technique used, and
has been since the declassification of the technology in the
mid-1950s as a consequence of the Atoms for Peace program.
The Purex process uses solvent extraction for separating
uranium and plutonium from fission products and produces ex-
ceptionally pure streams of plutonium and uranium in the
form of nitrates. This process can separate out over 99 per-
cent of the uranium and plutonium available.
Heavy water reactors (HWRs) such as the Canadian
CANDU produce about two grams of plutonium per kilogram and
no usable uranium. This compares to approximately six grams
of plutonium per kilogram for LWRs and some usable uranium,
therefore, reprocessing from HWRs is less economical. Yet
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reactor capacity is based on heavy water. Also, India has
77 percent of its planned capacity based on HWRs. It is dif-
ficult to understand how these countries can justify a HWR
based on economics.
The answer may lie somewhere in motives—especially
for India, Pakistan, and Argentina. The use of on-line re-
fueling for HWRs makes the safeguarding of fuel assemblies
more complex than with LWRs and it is therefore more diffi-
cult to detect diversion.
Reprocessing technology is now widely diffused and
the cost is clearly not prohibitive. There seems little
doubt that almost any state with a modest chemical industry
could on its own build a reprocessing plant large enough to
supply plutonium to a small explosives program.
A state may be interested in reprocessing:
1. because the likelihood of reprocessing and recycling
eventually becoming attractive for economic or energy-
conservation reasons, or the likelihood of eventually
relying on plutonium breeders is very high, and that
therefore a plutonium stockpile and a capability to
handle mixed-oxide fuels should be initiated at an
early date;
2. because of the attraction of creating an industry that
will permit the exercise of the weapons option quickly;
and
3. because it desires to separate the rather small quan-
tities of high-level radioactive wastes from larger
volumes of sp^nt fuel and to dispose of the former
permanently.
Many threshold nuclear countries are not endowed
with enough uranium ore to meet their energy requirements.
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This is reason enough for them to take measures to ensure
continued access to foreign energy supplies and to reduce
their dependency on uranium ore imports. By developing re-
processing plants for spent fuel and implementing sizeable
breeder reactor programs, many countries feel they can
attain energy self-sufficiency.
The construction of a reprocessing plant, which
could be clandestine, might take several months to a year.
However, the time elapsed from the acquisition of the fresh
fuel to the production of fissible material would be on the
order of days to weeks.
The ability to build a reprocessing plant is well
within the reach of a large number of states and many states
regard competence in plutonium technology as a hedge against
future security threats or as a mark of national prestige.
Above all, the global nuclear community views the
early establishment of reprocessing and recycling as a vital
precursor to the introduction of plutonium breeder reactors.
Without some form of reprocessing and plutonium reclamation,
the breeder would be pointless.
3 . Fast Breeders
Early projections of uranium sources showed that
standard thermal reactors would consume all the world's uran-
ium in a relatively short time, therefore, the development
of "breeder reactors" was proposed as the solution. Such
reactors actually produce more fissile material than they
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consume. They are able to do this by converting U-238 to
plutonium (Pu-239) or by converting thorium-232 to U-233,
another readily fissionable material, thereby greatly in-
creasing the nuclear fuel supply.
Several varieties have been proposed, but the lead-
ing technology is the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder, "which
would transmute a blanket of U-238 (placed around the core
14
to absorb surplus neutrons) into fissionable plutonium."
Advocates of the breeder frequently and publicly
question the usability of "reactor grade plutonium" in a nuc-
lear explosive. Their argument is based on the fact that
reactor grade plutonium simply has a higher Pu-240 and
Pu-242 content and therefore either is unusable or only of
value for low kiloton weapons (remember a few kilotons
killed millions in Japan)
.
In actuality, reactor grade plutonium is very usable:
the radial blankets of such reactors will normally contain
hundreds of kilograms of weapons grade plutonium on dis-
charge. In fact, they will contain 96 percent pure pluton-
ium-239, which is considerably purer than 92 percent limit
used in the definition of "weapons grade."
Breeders have provided the rationale for stockpiling
separated plutonium since the mid-1950s. In 1956, India
used the breeder argument as a reason to acquire a plutonium-
producing reactor and separation plant. Early acquisition
of this technology enabled the Indian government to respond
rather quickly to the Chinese nuclear explosion of 1964 and
their subsequent nuclear weapons program.
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Because of expected levels of economic growth in
both developing and industrial nations, as well as popula-
tion growth, global energy requirements in forty years will
probably be at least three times larger than today's. If
this sociological pressure comes to bear, breeders could
become extremely popular. Breeding recovers about "50 times
more energy per pound of uranium than can LWRs and would mul-
i p.
tiply the energy value of uranium reserves." But doing so
would entail commerce in plutonium that could be diverted to
weapons
.
If large numbers of fast-breeders come on the line during
the next decade, approximately 3,000 metric tons of plu-
tonium will have accumulated by the turn of the century,
therein placing still more burdens on the International
safeguard system.
The breeder program would greatly complicate the pro-
liferation problem and increase the possibility of theft or
diversion of material suitable for weapons. Until recently
the economics of the breeder have generally been considered
so persuasive that the proliferation problem has largely
been dismissed in government planning. U.S. policy has
played a major role in promoting foreign breeder programs.
Because of this encouragement, countries have anticipated
early introduction of breeder technology and therefore
acquired plutonium technology such as reprocessing plants,
and even to stockpile accumulations of plutonium.
Widespread use of fast breeders will revolutionize
the nuclear industry and will no doubt result in widespread
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nuclear proliferation. Delay of the U.S. breeder program
may not have a significant impact on the proliferation prob-
lem, but a continuation will only guarantee the early intro-
duction of a massive plutonium economy.
On October 28, 1976, President Ford changed the
course of U.S. nuclear policy when he stated:
I have decided that the United States should no longer
regard reprocessing of used nuclear fuel to produce plu-
tonium as a necessary and inevitable step in the nuclear
fuel cycle, and that we should pursue reprocessing and
recycling in the future only if they are found to be con-
sistent with our international objectives.
President Carter moved a step further by declaring
that the United States "will defer indefinitely commercial
reprocessing and recycling of plutonium produced in the U.S.
19
nuclear power program."
B. RECENT U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY
For more than twenty years, the U.S. policy pursued the
commercial nuclear market on the theory that the combination
of national safeguards and international inspections would
provide adequate protection against diversion to military
purposes. The slow realization that international inspec-
tion of plutonium stockpiles could not provide sufficient
protection altered U.S. policy.
President Carter brought to Washington new ideas and new
officials committed to the optimistic proposition that one
can distinguish between peaceful and nonpeaceful uses of
nuclear energy. This desire and belief has bedeviled U.S.
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nuclear policy since President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace
Program.
However, unlike the 1950s or even the '60s and '70s, the
international control of nuclear energy must be achieved in
a world that now projects a quantum increase in the world's
20
energy requirements. Most experts agree that nuclear
power is the most likely source to be pursued by most
countries
.
President Carter held certain convictions that caused
him to alter the nuclear course drastically. First, he
believed that if states suddenly decided to abrogate their
safeguard agreements, there would be no protection for the
enormous stockpiles of plutonium and enriched uranium that
would soon be spread around the globe. Second, he believed
that reprocessing and recycling of plutonium in LWRs was un-
economical and therefore the early introduction of plutonium
into international commerce was unnecessary.
Although the U.S. command of the nuclear export market
had diminished in the previous few years, it remained undeni-
ably influential as a supplier to other countries heavily
engaged in nuclear trade.
21Because the London Suppliers Group remained outside
the IAEA system and its negotiations were kept secret, it
had become suspect in the eyes of Third World countries, who
interpreted it as another device by the developed world to
22perpetuate its economic and technological dominance.
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Carter attempted to delay domestic construction of the
ingenious breeder reactor and simultaneously encourage other
countries to accept the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Evaluation Program (INFCEP) he had initiated.
The main objective of the INFCEP was to rethink the tech-
nical options for slowing nuclear proliferation by encourag-
ing the use of uranium derivatives of little use for military
purposes.
Carter's fear was well-founded. He did not believe that
existing safeguards could provide a probability of detection
great enough to deter decisions to acquire nuclear weapons.
Or, even if detection were possible, the warning would not
come in time for international response prior to the realiza-
tion of a weapons capability. Acquisition of these facili-
ties or materials allowed states to move closer to weapons
without having to make or acknowledge an explicit decision
to do so.
The INFCEP was unable to succeed in reconciling the vari-
ous national points of view about nuclear energy development.
The U.S. attempt to depoliticize the conference by approach-
ing what is basically a political issue from a purely techni-
cal angle failed because there is no such thing as a proli-
feration-proof nuclear fuel cycle, nor is there a "technical
23fix." Hoping for technical fixes which are illusory may
actually hinder proliferation efforts because they may under-
mine the development of sound institutional approaches.
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Another problem that occurred during the INFCEP was the
issue of nuclear exports and safeguards. The U.S. Congress,
reacting to the Indian nuclear explosion and the controver-
sial nuclear contracts signed in 1975-76 by West Germany and
France with South Korea, Pakistan, and Brazil involving en-
richment and/or reprocessing plants, passed the Nonprolif era-
tion Act of 1978 (NPA) . This act requires:
foremost consideration be given to whether or not the
transfer will take place under conditions that will ensure
timely warning to the United States of any diversion well
in advance of the time diverted material could be trans-
formed into weapons.
Under this Act, new and strict conditions were placed on
the technology activities of any country that wants to buy
nuclear goods and services from the U.S.
The NPA is so complex and restrictive that countries
will soon become frustrated to the point that they will even-
tually purchase their plants from someone else or they will
build their own.
Buyers resent the need for prior approval by the U.S.
for each specific retransfer or for reprocessing of spent
fuel which is of U.S. origin or which has been used in a
facility supplied by the U.S.
Long-term nuclear development in most countries has been
predicated on recovery and use of plutonium, and on techno-
logical efforts to achieve greater independence through the
development of breeder reactors. Thus, compliance with the
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U.S. NPA threatens their long-range nuclear policies and
possibly their national security.
Countries which make large commitments to nuclear energy
obviously need access to fuel supplies and are unlikely to
submit their energy source to a position which is dependent
on the internal political situation of the supplier country.
To increase the likelihood of cooperation among technol-
ogy suppliers, Carter undertook to increase U.S. capacity to
produce and hence export enriched uranium, thereby providing
enough enriched fuel to make dissemination of enrichment and
25
reprocessing capabilities unnecessary. Then a major con-
tradiction of policy occurred. President Carter withheld
government funds to the Clinch River Breeder Reactor, caus-
ing availability and terms of U.S. enrichment capacity to
become unknown.
The world's confidence in the U.S. as a cheap and reli-
able supplier of enriched uranium was already in question
because of the Nixon administration's insistence on trans-
ferring such facilities from government ownership to private
• j 26industry.
Generally speaking, Carter's tactics alienated countries
whose cooperation was vital for success. France resented
U.S. pressure to cancel her agreement to supply Pakistan
with a reprocessing plant. West Germany and Brazil both
resisted U.S. efforts to cancel their agreement for Brazil
to receive an entire nuclear fuel cycle. Finally, Japan was
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unhappy about U.S. insistence to alter her Tokai-mura facil-
ity to prevent the production of weapons-grade plutonium.
C. PLUTONIUM
The press toward nuclear power and independence has led
to actions and policies that have greatly increased the num-
ber of countries with quick access to highly enriched fissile
material— the most vital ingredient of nuclear weapons— as
part of their power programs.
Designing the bomb and getting the non-nuclear components
are much easier than getting the fissile material in high
enough concentrations for an explosive.
NNWS party to the NPT agreed not to make or acquire
nuclear explosives; they did not agree not to acquire the
prerequisites for doing so—materials and basic technology.
The spread of nuclear power programs has thus made the avail-
ability of plutonium or highly enriched U-235 widespread.
(See Table V.)
It only takes approximately ten kilograms of plutonium
to make a Nagasaki-size bomb and ten to fifteen kilograms of
enriched U-235 to make a Hiroshima-size one.
From these figures arises the prospect that by 1990 more
than thirty countries will have the plutonium on hand with
which to construct nuclear weapons. (See Figures I, II, and
III.)
The Acheson-Lilienthal group clearly saw the dangers on




INFCE: ESTIMATED FISSILE PLUTONIUM CONTENT OF CUMULATIVE
SPENT FUEL ARISINGS
(Tons from January 1978)
Country 1985 1990 2000
Belgium (4.96) (10.40) (27.30)
Denmark — — (2.80)
France 20.00 52.00 135.00
Germany, Federal Republic (17.16) (39.71) (107.45)
Ireland — — —
Italy 2.06 15.00 *
Luxembourg — — —
Netherlands (0.77) (2.45) (9.82)
UK 2.50 6.00 29.00
EUROPE (EEC) 47.5 125.6 311.4
Austria (0.55) (1.10) (2.20)
Finland (2.33) (4.58) (12.08)
Greece — (0.22) (2.30)
Iceland — — —
Norway -- — —
Portugal -- (0.42) (6.01)
Spain (6.99) (17.55) *
Sweden (7.84) (15.39) (28.00)
Switzerland 4.20 8.30 18.80
Turkey — — —
EUROPE (other) 21.9 47.5 69.4
EUROPE total 69.4 173.1 380.8
Canada (22.35) (48.79) (175.65)
USA (94.00) (191.50) (507.00)
N. AMERICA 116.4 240.3 682.7
Australia — _ _—
Japan 23.00 50.00 200.00
New Zealand — — —
PACIFIC AREA 23.00 50.00 200.00
TOTAL OECD 208.7 463.4 1263.5
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NON-OECD 18.5 54.0 276.2
TOTAL 227.2 517.4 1539.7




FIGURE I -THE OVERHANG OF COUNTRIES WITH ENOUGH SEPARABLE PLUTONIUM











•?5 kg OF PLUTONIUM WHICH MIGHT
PROVIDE ENOUGH BOMBS FOR
LAST RESORT USE IN ANTIPOPULATlON t ?
ATTACKS
* *
tt•'250 kg OF PLUTONIUM WHICH MIGHT
trt
25 PROVIOE ENOUGH B0V3S TO CALL FOR
Ml MORE SYSTEMATIC INTEGRATION INTO * *
1-



























SAME RATE AS THE
^*-*T \ COUNTRIES THAT HAVE PAST
y^-* EXPLODED A NUCLEAR DEVICE
I I 1 l i_ ' ' '
4S SO 55 GO 6S 70
CALENDAR YEAR
75 80 65 90




FIGURE II-COUNTRICS PLANNING TO HAVE PLANTS FOR SEPARATING PLUTONIUM OR
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energy. That effort obviously failed and the political lead-
ership of that period mistakenly thought that civilian reac-
tor safeguards could be stretched to cover the more dangerous
elements in the fuel cycle—when that day came. The U.S.
followed a course that allowed for the use of plutonium to
27
go forward unhampered. There is where the damage was done.
Not only did the plutonium economy proceed unfettered,
the U.S. actually encouraged it by selling nuclear technol-
ogy to NNWS. 28
If U.S. policies are to cope with the spread of military
nuclear technology rather than encourage it, it is essential
that they be more than symbolic and well-intentioned, more
than "allusive and sentimental," as Robert Oppenheimer
called "atoms for peace." They need to be concrete and
aimed precisely at the problems posed by changes in the real
world.
Florence Nightingale summed up what U.S. policy should
attempt to accomplish when she said: "Whatever else hospit-
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V. DETERIORATION OF NONPROLIFERATION REGIME




To arrest the spread of nuclear weapons would be to per-
petuate an international status quo in which some countries
are denied political and strategic assets that other coun-
tries, certainly no more deserving, are entitled to have.
Yet to condone nuclear proliferation for the sake of
equality within the international system seems absurd. Pre-
tending equality and nuclear safety are fully compatible
values might lead to the achievement of neither. One cannot
be pursued while the other is ignored.
Whether any given country decides to use its capability
to acquire nuclear weapons depends on how that country
views its needs and interests in the context of the military,
political, economic and moral climate of the world.
There are specific factors that profoundly influence a
country's attitude toward going nuclear. Countries have
different situations regarding their security, their politi-
cal problems, their economic position, and the importance
they attach to such matters of status and prestige.
Predicting the precise nature of the international non-
proliferation regime for the next ten to twenty years would
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be a difficult, if not impossible, task. History has taught
us well about the unpredictability of the world we live in
—
events often occur unexpectantly and with sudden swiftness.
While single events rarely alter the international system
itself, they can be one of a progression of events that can
influence the system, and thus drastically affect the frag-
ile nonproliferation regime.
Once the regime is weakened and eroded, it is predicta-
ble that numerous countries will feel constrained to convert
their technological capability into military form, either,
by manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons or, what is
more likely, by exploding a nuclear device for allegedly
peaceful programs.
There is a strong and persuasive argument that this pro-
gression of events is now occurring and will soon culminate
in a multitude of nuclear explosions around the world.
The Chinese and Indian nuclear explosions show a defi-
nite linkage; the U.S. nuclear and/or conventional relia-
bility is being questioned throughout the world in the post
Vietnam-Watergate era; U.S. participation in regional con-
flicts has been restrained since the arrival of U.S. -Soviet
parity in both nuclear and conventional forces; and all
nations now fully understand the stark realization that
they are energy vulnerable. Moreover, Brazil, China, India,
Japan, and West Germany are eager to become international
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actors in the fullest sense, which can only aggravate
regional insecurities.
Development of nuclear weapons need not be accompanied
by the articulation of a well thought-out doctrine. Rather,
simple possession of a few nuclear weapons might be regarded
generally, as a good thing, providing diffuse benefits.
Included in these benefits would be uncertainty on an adver-
sary's part, increased self assurance in bargaining with
other countries, greater international status, improved
morale within the scientific-industrial establishment,
strengthening public support and lessening domestic opposi-
tion, and finally and probably most importantly, a perceived
security insurance.
This section does not attempt to describe the probable
forces and doctrine of each of the 30-35 potential future
nuclear states. Any attempt to do so would involve a
heavier emphasis upon detailed country-by-country analysis
than possible; it would also be greatly handicapped by the
difficulties of attempting to predict such specific details
ten to twenty years in advance.
The following is a discussion of the various incentives
and/or pressures the leaders of any country will have to
deal with when considering the nuclear option.
A. SECURITY INCENTIVES
Nuclear weapons confer enormous advantages upon a coun-
try possessing them, and can offset imbalances in population,
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industrial potential, natural resources, and other compo-
nents of military power. Even a few bombs with embryonic
delivery capabilities could make devastating strikes against
selected cities. (See Table VI.)
The extent to which security interests encourage or dis-
courage the acquisition of nuclear weapons can best be exam-
ined by distinguishing between (1) essentially regional
security interests, and (2) security interests that derive
from the possibility of confrontation with major military
powers with global interests.
If a NNWS has a pressing concern for its military secur-
ity, acquiring nuclear weapons clearly becomes a salient
policy option.
There are four specific military objectives for which
the acquisition of nuclear weapons seem an appropriate
option:
1. Deterrence of, defense against and/or retaliation for
a nuclear or conventional attack or nuclear blackmail
by the U.S. or the U S.S.R.;
2. deterrence of, defense against and/or retaliation for
a nuclear or conventional attack or nuclear blackmail
by a minor NWS;
3. deterrence of, defense against and/or retaliation for
conventional attack by neighboring or regional adver-
sary NNWS or group of NNWS adversaries or domination
of such NNWS adversaries;
4. anticipatory reaction to the prospective acquisition
of nuclear weapons by a local or regional NNWS adver~ 9
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The first of these objectives would be global while the
remaining three would be in the regional context.
1 . Global Security Interests
There are basically two sorts of global security
interests: 1) the desire to deter or protect against
threats or military incursions by major NWS with global
interests (U.S. and U.S.S.R.); and 2) the aim of increasing
or decreasing the involvement of the superpowers in regional
disputes
.
Defensively, a country pitted against a superpower
would be able to inflict damage many times greater than with
conventional weapons. Although the superpower would be able
to annihilate the lesser nuclear power, the price may be so
high as to outvalue the objectives of the aggression. The
objectives themselves
—
ports, industries, cultural centers,
or people—may be obliterated if the nuclear exchange actu-
ally occurs. This is the basis of nuclear deterrence theory
and makes nuclear weapons extremely attractive to small
nations confronted with belligerent and military superior
neighbors.
The element of uncertainty introduced by nuclear
possession should not be underestimated. Rarely are super-
power interests challenged sufficiently by small countries
to warrant even a small risk of nuclear retaliation. There-
fore the possession of nuclear weapons by small countries
would probably serve as an effective deterrent against
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direct military intervention by a superpower, and countries
concerned about such intervention might find that option
3
attractive.
General Charles de Gaulle's early concept of the
utility of French nuclear weapons may be the same reason
that other countries now feel that nuclear weapons do in
fact have a significant military utility. "To be able to
tear off an arm from a potential adversary" might constitute
4
a sufficient deterrent for a smaller country.
It is difficult to predict if the nuclearization of
a regional dispute would draw the superpowers in, but gen-
erally speaking it seems unlikely they would seek a unilat-
eral advantage from a local conflict. In all probability,
they would jointly intervene to diffuse tensions for fear
5
of hostilities getting out of control.
2 . Regional Security Interests
Many NNWS face problems of national security within
their regions which seem likely to provide the major incen-
tives for developing nuclear weapons. (See Appendix C.)
Whether in the Middle East, South America, Southeast Asia,
Africa, Europe, or the Asian subcontinent, a country will
evaluate whether it goes nuclear or not mainly because of
what it regards as threats or potential threats to its
security from its neighbors. Pakistan is most concerned
about what India is doing while Argentina is most concerned
about Brazil. None of the major participants is likely to
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acquiesce readily to second-class non-nuclear status or to
a position of marked nuclear inferiority vis-a-vis its
regional opponent (s).
a. Defense Against Invasion
Many NNWS feel that possession of nuclear weap-
ons will provide a defense against invasion. This type of
defense would be especially attractive to a country confront-
ing an opponent whose conventional forces are superior, for
example, Pakistan versus India or Taiwan versus China.
Nuclear weapons would also be valuable to a country in which
terrain forces the opponent to mass its troops and equipment
through natural invasion corridors, for example, North Korea
7
versus South Korea and Israel versus Egypt.
Any state engaged in a border dispute or a
regional confrontation with a nuclear armed state would have
an incentive to develop its own nuclear capability. The
objective would be both to neutralize the political and
military advantage of the opponent's nuclear weapons and to
deter attack by conventional forces.
b. Anticipatory Acquisition
In the case of a long standing confrontation or
competition between NNWS in which one suspects the other of
developing nuclear weapons may also encourage the other to
go nuclear. Acquisition by either Argentina or Brazil,
Indonesia or Australia or North or South Korea. would likely
spur the other to follow suit rapidly, as did India after
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the Chinese explosion and the declaration of Pakistan to get
"the" bomb.
Even if there were no evidence of an actual
weapons program, a government that believed its regional
rival would inevitably acquire a nuclear capability might
feel compelled to begin its own program.
The development of nuclear weapons may also be
beneficial to the leaders of a state whose regional security
is likely to deteriorate because of international political
considerations. Two particular sets of circumstances that
might lead to this conclusion by a government are worth
identifying.
States that face gradual but relentless politi-
cal isolation within the international community would form
one group. These states are generally referred to as
"pariah" states and include South Africa, Taiwan, Israel,
and South Korea. Israel and South Africa are prime suspects
concerning the possible nuclear explosion that occurred at
3:00 A.M., local time, on September 22, 1979, in the Indian
g
Ocean near the southern tip of Africa.
These states would not want to use nuclear weap-
ons, but rather would see the uncertainty and changed psy-
chological environment that resulted from their acquisition
as sufficient to deter hostile acts by their opponents.
The second set of countries that may decide to
go nuclear because of changed political conditions would be
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countries that see a long-term deterioration and eventual
unraveling of existing alliances and security guarantees as
occurring.
For whatever reasons, a weakening of U.S.
security guarantees to countries such as Australia, South
Korea, The Philippines, Japan, and/or West Germany could
stimulate significant pressure to acquire nuclear weapons.
Hence, the production of nuclear weapons as a feasible and
acceptable alternative to politically unpalatable security
arrangements may soon become the norm rather than the
exception.
In summation, the Indian nuclear program can be used
to demonstrate the linkage of decisions among regional
antagonists to get nuclear explosives, and also the fact
that the linkage is a network of competing national interests
and domestic factions.
The Sino-Soviet split and confrontation in the late
1950s coupled with the Sino-Indian conflict in 1962 had a
direct bearing on the Chinese nuclear explosion in 1964.
The Chinese explosion generated a policy debate among Indian
domestic factions that led more or less steadily to a
nuclear explosion nearly ten years later.
Fear of possible blackmail by a nuclear armed Indian
government and defeat in the 1971 Indian-Pakistani war in
turn has led to Pakistan's decision to get nuclear weapons,
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"even if," as former Prime Minister Bhutto said, "we have to
eat grass."
Maybe the most damaging aspect of both the Chinese
and Indian nuclear explosions is the generalized lowering of
the nuclear taboo. This consequence could prove fatal to
the nonproliferation regime.
3 . Security System Breakdown
The major issues revolve around two premises.
1. The position of the near-nuclear country vis-a-vis
present nuclear states (for example, whether or not
the near-nuclear country is under a nuclear umbrella
in which it has a reasonable degree of confidence)
,
and;
2. the nature of any perceived threat (s) to its national
security, or, conversely* the extent of the country s
international ambitions.
Since 1961 when Pierre Gallois professed the fear that
the U.S. would never retaliate against Moscow because she
had invaded Europe, there has been a strong argument for
independent nuclear forces.
Some recalcitrant nations have asked some ponderable
questions concerning U.S. security promises. Would the U.S.
protect a NNWS against nuclear attack by credibly threaten-
ing retaliation? Second, can the nuclear umbrella deter con-
ventional attacks? Third, can the umbrella deter acquisition
of nuclear weapons in a regional context?
There is a plausible argument that a U.S. President
may not even respond to a selected nuclear strike on the
U.S. homeland for fear of annihilation.
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Present NATO doctrine, which is the strongest U.S.
security commitment, advocates escalation to strategic nuc-
lear weapons. Does it not seem somewhat ridiculous that
NATO would continue to adhere to an escalation doctrine when
strategic parity is accepted by both the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R.? Granted this is only doctrine and deterrence its
goal, but credibility is the key word. Therefore, question-
ing of U.S. credibility does not seem nonsensical.
Many countries meet their security needs through
alliances with NWS, yet these treaties can be hazardous.
First, there is the fear that when the need arises, help
will not arrive. History is full of nonperformance. Second,
there is always the possibility that a partner will draw all
members of an alliance into a war when only one country has
a grievance. World War I is a good example of this problem.
The Indian experience can again be used for example.
Countries outside credible alliance systems are particularly
likely to opt for nuclear weapons. After the Chinese nuc-
lear explosion, the Indian government quietly and cautiously
tried to gain nuclear security guarantees from both the U.S.
and/or the U S.S.R. Their attempts yielded nothing very sub-
12
stantial, thus May 18, 1974, became inevitable.
The questionable credibility of the U.S. strategic
nuclear umbrella is causing a number of formerly satisfied
allies seriously to consider investing in their own nuclear
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weapons, not to mention those countries outside the U.S.
13guarantee (such as India)
.
B. POLITICAL INCENTIVES
NWS have recognized since the outset of the nuclear age
that nuclear weapons have served important symbolic func-
tions. Nuclear weapons symbolize a country's modernity,
scientific prowess, and technological capability and thus
clearly possess political as well as military utility.
It is important here to distinguish between the weapons
and the politics. As Clausewitz said, "War is not a mere
act of policy but a true political instrument, a continua-
14
tion of political activity by other means."
The foremost political incentive for acquiring nuclear
weapons is their ability to enhance national power. Over
time, a new nuclear state could expect to increase its
influence in international forums as well as increase its
regional status. This change in role would occur because
of subtle alterations in the psychological orientation of
states toward the new NWS. It would be a gradual and com-
plex process, but nonetheless real.
How much more importance the outside world has attached
to China since she entered the nuclear club. China cannot
be considered as an insignificant or overrated international
actor because of one ominous fact— she has developed nuclear
weapons. Bombs do make a difference.
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The second most important political incentive for a
country to develop nuclear weapons is prestige. Prestige
could almost be said to be the resultant of national power.
Some would argue that the only hope for nuclear disarmament
is for the nonproliferation regime to develop in such a way
that a country becomes more prestigious by not having
nuclear weapons. It does not appear likely this course will
be followed.
1 . National Power
Military power is a symbol and a source as well as
an instrument of political power. A country can engender
pride, enhance its prestige, and influence the psychological
climate by acquiring a strong military force. In the inter-
national arena where conflicting national interests are pur-
sued and frequently settled short of war, military capability
often is a country's most useful asset.
Without a doubt, countries want all the trappings
of power. Before World War II a huge fleet complete with
battleships was indicative of power. After the War, it was
the aircraft carrier. Even Brazil and Argentina bought
carriers. Now countries are beginning to realize the car-
rier is no longer the symbol of power, but nuclear weapons
are.
France, China, and to some degree India are examples
of the independence that indigenous nuclear arsenals (capa-
bility in India's case) represent. These countries are in
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an envious position among many nations of the world because
of their nuclear capability. They are no longer dependent
on a separate nuclear force and can bargain from a position
that more represents their interests. More important, per-
haps, is their ability to stand aside during a major confron-
16
tation of the two superpowers.
2. National Prestige
Nationalism is by far the strongest political force
in the world today, having become so after about three cen-
turies of evolution. The greatest danger of nationalism in
the modern world is that its loyalties are too narrow.
Nationalism does not admit of obligations beyond its own
frontiers, of rights and duties which transcend the state.
Whether or not the nuclear age soon becomes the
second stone age could be directly related to how the non-
proliferation regime handles the force of nationalism.
When France tested its first nuclear weapon on Febru-
ary 13, 1960, President de Gaulle sent the following telegram
to his representative at the test site.
Hurrah for France! From this morning she is strong and
prouder. From the bottom of my heart thanks to you and
those who have brought her this magnificent success. 1
Prestige is relative and can be increased through
the acquisition of nuclear weapons (such as France) or
depreciated through the acquisition of nuclear arms by




particularly if it is a smaller country with overlapping
spheres of influence.
Tremendous pressure would accrue to Brazil, for
instance, if Argentina should explode a "peaceful nuclear
device," as it would to West Germany if a Swedish or Swiss
explosion occurred. Sadly, NWS have been granted greater
status and influence in the international arena.
Prestige in the broadest sense was an important
factor in both the British and French decisions and pre-
sumably predominant in the Chinese and Indian decisions.
Acquisition of nuclear weapons does not make a
country great. But in a world where a few countries domi-
nate the wealth and power, while others struggle for eco-
nomic independence and self respect, it is not beyond
belief that national leaders could see nuclear weapons as
an easy way to exercise their sovereignty.
Nuclear weapon development could also be seen as a
way to help alleviate the frustrations of poverty and eco-
nomic failures. They might be expected to bolster a
nation's self confidence and prestige, or to restore or
strengthen popular support for a particular regime. It
should be remembered that in the U.S. the space program at
one time or another has served many of these functions.
Pakistan can be used as an example to further
explore the prestige factor in acquiring nuclear weapons.
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Prestige and internal pressures have played a signi-
ficant role in the Pakistani drive for nuclear weapons, espe-
cially in light of Indian public criticism. Under both the
Bhutto and Zia governments, completion of the nuclear pro-
gram in the face of outside criticism acquired a nationalis-
tic appeal within the government, and both regimes feared a
halt of the program would lead to a loss of domestic support
Prime Minister Bhutto made clear what Pakistan's
ultimate intentions were and why.
We all know that Israel and South Africa have full nuclear
capability. The Christian, Jewish, and Hindu civilizations
have this capability The Communist powers also possess
it. Only the Islamic civilization, was without it, but
that position was about to change.
Pakistan is dangerous enough, but what happens if a
country like Japan, which aspires to become a permanent mem-
ber of the security council, decides it has to pay the club
entrance fee by developing nuclear weapons? If the norm is
weakened and proliferation seems inevitable, the psychologi-
cal impact of multiple withdrawals of the NPT could result
in a snowballing effect.
C. BUREAUCRATIC PRESSURES
To fully understand any governmental policy decision, it
is imperative for one to realize that hidden coalitions of
bureaucratic factions often strongly influence the final out-
come. Private business interests or personal interests of
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government officials must be sought out and identified in
order to understand the positions adopted at all stages of
the diplomatic process. Decisionmakers are frequently iso-
lated from those bureaucrats who are truly motivated by a
"national interest."
Holders of bureaucratic offices attempt to get ahead by
expanding their bureaus' services, operations, and tables of
organizations. Individuals whose future is tied to the suc-
cess of a certain project or who have spent an entire career
promoting a particular idea will fight to the death. It is
basic human nature to protect one's turf.
Certain businessmen would sell their soul for a profit
and could hardly be trusted not to sell critical materials
needed for nuclear weapons. This aspect cannot be limited
to private concerns as there are also tremendous pressures
among supplier states to provide nuclear materials and
equipment.
In India, the only real support for the NPT came from
senior civil-service employees who feared a cut-off of U.S.
or Soviet aid necessary to keep their particular bureaus in
20
operation.
Even in the U.S., the country that arguably stands to
gain the most from the NPT, several areas of in-fighting
were evident. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(ACDA) was solidly in favor of the treaty, but other
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sections of the State Department were not. Certain desk
officers were especially sympathetic to the country in which
they had spent a large part of their career when that coun-
try decided not to support the NPT. Bureaucrats in favor of
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in some cases even peaceful
21
nuclear explosions, also balked. Even after the Indian
nuclear explosion, much of the bureaucracy in the U.S. per-
sisted in the fiction that India had not violated their
Agreement on Cooperation with the U.S. in using U.S. -sup-
plied heavy water to produce plutonium for explosives.
In sum, bureaucracies within potential nuclear countries
make it possible to drift into a military program without
taking a positive decision until very late, or possibly
after the fact. As previously stated, the legitimate acqui-
sition of large quantities of highly concentrated fissile
material has facilitied the decision to make bombs in the
past. The U.K., France, and India all decided to produce
and separate plutonium well before they overtly decided on a
>2
nuclear weapons program.
Traditionally nationalistic, chauvinistic, and expansion-
ist elements would inevitably support a nuclear program.
In most countries, those branches of the military which
would gain the most decisive advantage in their operational
roles are most active in promoting a decision in favor of
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producing bombs. For any NNWS to make the fateful decision
to "go nuclear" some component of the military and technical
communities must favor it.
Generals believe that the simple possession of nuclear
weapons will deny an enemy the advantages of concentration.
Tactical theories based on the use of nuclear weapons have
gained an important place in the tactical doctrine of the
U.S. Army. In those countries where military staffs have
considerable influence, these considerations must be
expected to carry significant weight.
The morale of any military organization is directly
related and dependent upon the knowledge that their equip-
ment is technically as good as the enemy's.
Many times elements of the scientific and industrial
communities may argue for nuclear weapons because they feel
renunciation' could have economic costs. Scientists have
argued in the past that valuable spin-offs in the peaceful
application of nuclear energy may be lost if weapons
research is explicitly forbidden, since the technologies
often overlap. It should be pointed out that in this coun-
try scientists and bureaucrats promote the space program in
the name of everything from medical research to weed control
In general, the military and scientific communities will
strongly support nuclear weapons programs as a means of




Kissinger's remark at the 1974 Moscow summit summed up
the problem: "both sides have to convince their military
establishments of the benefits of restraint, and that is
not a thought that comes naturally to military people on
23
either side." Clearly, the arms control voice is much
too weak within a bureaucratic structure dominated by the
military and their political allies.
D. ARMS CONTROL PRESSURES
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to
pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear
arms race at an early date and to nuclear dis-
armament, and on a treaty on general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective inter-
national control.
NPT; Article VI
This article was an attempt by the NWS to overcome the
objection of the NNWS that it was unfair for some states to
be prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons while others
were allowed to retain and even improve the quality of
their weapons. It was widely believed, that over the long
24
haul, such an arrangement was nonviable.
Most NNWS rejected the argument of the NWS that under
Article II (See Appendix A) of the NPT the great powers
have the right to increase their stockpiles of nuclear weap-
ons while the NNWS are forbidden from acquiring them. These
NNWS see the greatest danger to international stability
arising not from the horizontal proliferation of nuclear
113

weapons but from the vertical proliferation of the
superpowers
.
The Indian government has called the Strategic Arms
Limitation Treaty (SALT I) a smokescreen that not only
enabled the superpowers to "legitimize" their existing
stockpiles of launchers but also "licensed" their continued
proliferation in the form of MIRVed warheads. Professing
concern about nuclear proliferation on the one hand while
seeking approval of the neutron bomb on the other seem
25
ridiculous to most NNWS
.
The NNWS have good reason to question the "good faith"
of the superpowers. For the uneducated, the past few years
may have seemed like a period in which significant strides
in arms control has taken place. The superpowers have
worked hard at projecting this image (See Table VII)
.
Indeed more arms control pacts have been concluded between
1959-1974 than ever before, but none of them have restrained
the strategic arms race.
Instead of reducing existing high levels of nuclear
forces, SALT I permitted both sides to build up substan-
tially (See Table VIII). These numbers have increased even
more today.
Pentagon advocates of new strategic weapons contend
that the production of these new "bargaining chips"
strengthen the hand of U.S. negotiators at SALT vis-a-vis
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systems can be dismantled for equal concessions from the
Soviets. The problem arises after the weapons are approved,
produced, and deployed. Pentagon rationale then changes and
the weapons system such as MIRV is no longer expendable, but
a vital part of the U.S. deterrent. Such doublethink may
undermine long-range national security, as Senator Stuart
Symington put so aptly before the Senate Armed Forces
Committee:
The A3M was sold as a bargaining chip; Trident was sold
as a bargaining chip, and this new counterforce targeting
is being sold as a bargaining chip. It took us four years
to win World War II. What we dropped on Germany and Japan
in four years was one twenty-fifth of one percent in TNT
equivalent of what we have in the nuclear stockpile ready
to drop tomorrow . . . Looking at the other vital aspects
of true national security, the economic picture, I am wor-
ried about still more bargaining chips that pop up regu-
larly and so heavily increase our military cost. '
As George Kennan once said, there is no absolute secur-
ity in a world of nuclear explosives, and perhaps the great-
est danger one can run is to seek absolute security."
The raw megatonnage available to the leaders of the
superpowers today is great enough to destroy civilization
as we know it
—
possibly forever. Many have argued that pre-
cisely because of this capability nuclear weapons will never
be used, but this has done little to allay the fears of
people throughout the world.
The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. can hardly claim they have
always behaved responsibly with their nuclear arsenals. The
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U.S. actually used nuclear weapons in wartime and there is
strong evidence that both have threatened to use them in the
period between 1953 (Korea) and the worldwide alert in
October 1973.
President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger only
exacerbated the negative feelings (concerning nuclear
threats) among NNWS when they moved the U.S. toward a coun-
terforce strategic doctrine. This was dangerous because it
undermined the conditions of stable deterrence. Of course,
Nixon and Kissinger were searching for an effective and poli-
tially inexpensive means of projecting U.S. nuclear power in
international politics. In the wake of Vietnam, this was
somewhat understandable, nonetheless they were threatening a
wide range of nuclear use in order to maintain the interna-
tional status quo.
The fear of NNWS is genuine and it is easy to see why
they have little faith in the "good faith" of the
superpowers.
How does vertical proliferation affect horizontal pro-
liferation? It seems plausible for a link to exist between
the two. It is difficult to see why some nations would con-
tinue to forego nuclear weapons, while the superpowers con-
tinue to increase and perfect their nuclear arsenals. This
augmentation and improvement has the political impact of
renewing the glamour of nuclear weapons, thereby making fur-
29ther proliferation more likely.
117

The failure to agree on a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB)
also increases the likelihood because continued U.S. -Soviet
testing only reinforces threshold nuclear states 1 impres-
sions that nuclear weapons can have a military and/or
political application.
Some U.S. and Soviet officials still argue for an exemp-
tion for the testing of "peaceful nuclear explosions."
Obviously all segments of the U.S. population either do not
31 . .fear nuclear proliferation or have different motivations.
India should have taught the world a lesson about slipping
in the back door.
Not only are the two superpowers failing at strategic
arms negotiations they continue to blatantly violate the
spirit of the NPT in other areas—namely the modernization
of their tactical nuclear forces. This is one area that
some threshold nuclear states may feel they can match the
superpowers successfully. A tactical nuclear doctrine is a
militarily useable doctrine.
As a practical matter, it is very difficult for the
political leaders of a nuclear capable country to tell its
citizenry that it will continue indefinitely to forswear
nuclear weapons while the superpowers produce as fast as
they can.
Article VI of the NPT is a major quid pro quo for adher-
ence to the treaty. If there is continued nuclear stock-
piling by the NWS and observance of the treaty by the NNWS ,
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the motivation to remain a member will become less and less.
It will become a situation of the strong get stronger and
the weak get weaker.
If this attitude develops many NNWS may soon withdraw
(including Japan and West Germany). If this haopens , the
cornerstone of nonproliferation regime will have folded and
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The Devil: "I have examined Man's wonderful inven-
tions. And I tell you that in the arts of life man
invents nothing, but in the arts of death he outdoes
Nature herself, and produces by chemistry and machin-
ery all the slaughter of plague, pestilence, and
famine. The peasant I tempt today eats and drinks
what was eaten and drunk ten thousand years ago; and
the house he lives in has not altered as much in a
thousand centuries as the fashion of a lady's bon-
net in a score of weeks. But when he goes to slay,
he carries a marvel of mechanism that lets loose
at the touch of his finger all the hidden molecular
energies, and he leaves the javelin, the arrow, the
blowpipe of his fathers far behind. In the arts of
peace Man is a bungler . . . his heart is in his
weapons .
"
Act III, Man and Superman,
by George Bernard Shaw (1903)
There are two questions that must be asked when contem-
plating the possibilities for nuclear nonproliferation.
1. Is it feasible to have an international system in
which certain countries derive political and technological
benefits by virtue of their possession of nuclear weapons
and at the same time prevent other countries which are
within the reach of this technology from aspiring for these
same benefits?
2. Is it realistic to envisage a world where certain
powers have military doctrines based on the use of nuclear




These questions exhibit in stark detail the hypocrisy of
the NWS's nonproliferation policy. They also point out the
unwillingness of decisionmakers to examine the close linkage
between a country's decision to acquire nuclear weapons and
its perception of a serious or overwhelming security threat.
The world grows increasingly complex each day. In most
nations of the world, domestic political weaknesses and econ-
omic difficulties exert higher degrees of pressures for
short-term nationalistic responses to urgent resource, econ-
omic, and security problems that can only be solved, if at
all, by multinational efforts.
The U.S. has found it increasingly difficult to manage
its sphere of influence. Once cooperative and often sub-
servient nations have recently shown a greater independence.
With the spread of nuclear weapons and the dangers associa-
ted with that spread, the possibility for profound change in
the structure of world politics exists.
There is little reason to believe that a world of twenty
or thirty nuclear countries would inevitably produce global
holocaust or that small nuclear wars would be a common occur-
rence. Nonetheless, nuclear threats will become more common
and nuclear exchanges more likely, possibly including con-
flict between the great powers. In 1995, as in 1914, a
series of moves in a complex interlinked environment could
produce a global catastrophe. Keeping the probability of
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such a disaster from happening will obviously be the most
pressing problem of the two superpowers.
The spread of nuclear technologies, both civilian and
military, is inherently destabilizing. The most serious
trends are the spread of inexpensive isotope separation and
reprocessing equipment, the accumulation of reprocessed
plutonium, and the diffusion of technology for effective
delivery systems. The susceptibility of these technologies
to effective international control is minimal. The tremen-
dous increase in the number of technology suppliers has
greatly reduced the effectiveness of unilateral decisions
by any one country or small groups of countries. Basically
commercial competition is too great for a denial approach
to work.
Technology spread is particularly dangerous insofar as
it limits the chances of restraining the rate of nuclear
weapons proliferation. As nuclear power programs grow,
nations will inevitably edge closer to the capacity to make
a bomb. As a state sees its neighbor creeping toward the
nuclear club through the construction of a series of nuclear
power plants and related facilities, it might worry that
fabrication of a bomb is only a matter of time and thus move
to acquire its own weapons.
Those states that face local confrontations and disputes
are the most likely nuclear proliferants . Once a confron-
tation actually develops into a crisis in which one or both
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sides possess nuclear weapons a higher probability of them
being used results.
This statistically higher risk is amplified by the fact
that some new proliferants will be less self-controlled and
less prudent than the older NWS, an unpopular but certainly
a logical expectation. Nuclear hostilities have to be more
of a possibility in the hands of messianic leaders or
regimes threatened with extinction or countries lacking
adequate conventional capabilities.
U.S. military forces have frequently been required to
preserve the balance of power in regional confrontations.
Korea and Vietnam demonstrated the ease with which the U.S.
can be dragged into a conflict. This military involvement
has been dictated by a lack of credibility of the indigenous
forces when confronted by a conventionally armed neighbor.
It is comforting, and therefore popular, to assume that
nuclear weapons will be as unusable once widespread as they
are generally assumed to be unusable today. But this simply
is not true .
Ironically because of Vietnam, a "nuclear Vietnam" may
soon be in the offing. In the foreseeable future it is high-
ly unlikely that the U.S. will become militarily involved in
the same limited manner in another regional dispute (witness
El Salvador)
. Therefore, regional nuclear belligerents may
use nuclear weapons. Not all threats of nuclear aggression
will be offset by a promise of nuclear response.
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The alliance systems centered on the U.S. are less effec-
tive than when created. The world is changing. This weaken-
ing is a product of several factors, including defeat of the
U.S. in Vietnam and the resultant Nixon Doctrine; a determin-
ation not to get burned again overseas; and the concern
about the futility of armed action against the Soviet Union,
which is the heart of the much-desired detente policy.
Nuclear proliferation will further reduce the super-
powers' (especially the U.S. 1 ) ability to control events.
It will have a dissolvent effect on alliances, expose over-
seas forces to huge new risks, and ultimately impose large
costs in shaping an internal defensive system to protect U.S.
cities against terrorist attacks.
Countries which feel threatened, abandoned, or lack con-
fidence in the U.S. nuclear arrangement are the countries
most likely to acquire nuclear weapons (See Appendix C)
.
South Korean confidence in the U.S. agreement was shaken by
the U.S. failure in Vietnam and President Carter's ill-
thought-out troop withdrawal initiative. Israel fears they
may be forced into making what they consider to be fatal con-
cessions, or possibly abandoned outright in a crisis that
threatened superpower confrontation. Taiwan, Japan, and
Australia are concerned about the U.S. -China rapprochement.
Argentina and Brazil are bitter rivals and are members of a
decreasingly viable Hemispheric collective security system.
Pakistan has received conventional arms from the U.S. but
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hardly expects the U.S. to intervene on their behalf. South
Africa is totally isolated politically, and India is openly
unaligned
.
Even NATO has its problems and it is not totally incom-
prehensible that events could occur to cause countries such
as Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Italy, or West Germany to
feel a need for their own nuclear weapons.
Nuclear proliferation prospects must not be considered
exclusively from a security perspective. Power and prestige
are important motivating forces.
Each state that ratifies the NPT helps to refute the cur-
ious though tenacious notion that the detonation of a nuclear
device heralds a nation v s arrival as a great power. The In-
dian nuclear test and continued testing by the NWS have sig-
nificantly weakened the nuclear taboo against nuclear weapons
It is one thing for highly industrialized countries to
have nuclear weapons, but for countries such as Pakistan or
Argentina to acquire them is a different matter. If several
of the poorer countries of the world decide to "go nuclear"
the richer NNWS will be under unbearable internal pressures
to also acquire them. Proliferation to only a few countries
might well revitalize the belief that possession of nuclear
weapons, irrespective of military risk or gain, or even mor-





Whether proliferation threatens the international system
itself will depend upon who joins the nuclear club and how
fast its membership expands. The greater the number of coun-
tries that have nuclear weapons, the greater the probabil-
ity that they will be used. The farther they proliferate,
the greater the risk that nuclear weapons will enter areas
troubled by Political quarrels.
Kenneth Waltz's argument that "more may be better" is
based upon the premise that nuclear weapons will everywhere
be introduced in a way and at a pace that will make for
stable deterrence. But there are three special features of
a proliferating world that do not always insure deterrence.
These are: (1) utility— the perceived coercive and military
value of nuclear weapons to states facing a local confronta-
tion; (2) uncertainty— the inflamed suspicions, reduced pre-
dictability of behavior, and increased risk of miscalcula-
tion that would result from the existence of undisclosed
nuclear capabilities (much as Israel and South Africa have
already done) ; and (3) the unevenness with which nuclear
weapons will spread to various regions.
Nuclear proliferation is probably inevitable but more




Proliferation is more of a menace to the international
system than is the superpower arms race. Proliferation
increases the chances that nuclear weapons will actually be
used, whereas the arms race is not likely to dislodge the
constraints against the mutual assured destruction doctrine.
The purpose of arms control is not necessarily to dis-
arm, but to prevent accidental, catalytic, or preemptive
nuclear war, thus the politicians, technicians, and diplo-
mats had best address itself more to the proliferation
problem.
There are, broadly speaking, two approaches to stemming
nuclear proliferation. The first is technical: keeping the
wherewithal to make bombs out of the hands of NNWS . The
second is political: tending to the fears and suppressing
the aspirations that cause countries to "go nuclear."
Technical and economic barriers are becoming increas-
ingly unreliable as technical and industrial skills and
capabilities increase. This very technology has led us to
a nasty choice between nuclear proliferation and the need
for energy supplies. Many seem to think that technology is
the answer to everything and it will bail us out of this
dilemma. Can we afford to count on it?
Although there are technical things that can and should
be done, a technical fix does not seem to be the total
answer. True, the fundamental element of nonproliferation
policy should be to encourage a broad consensus to avoid a
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plutonium economy For this to become a reality, widespread
cooperation on a level so far unattainable will be needed.
Political barriers against nuclear weapons will have to be
constructed higher and stronger than has previously been
possible.
Any international reexamination of the fuel cycle can
hardly be credible if the U.S. continues to forge ahead with
its own plans for reprocessing fuel and with its program for
early commercialization of the breeder reactor. Strong U.S.
leadership is essential.
Recent U.S. policy has been one of actively promoting
nuclear energy in NNWS in forms that provide access to read-
ily fissionable material, subsidizing the financing of nuc-
lear power programs, providing research reactors, assisting
in "critical experiments" that involve hundres of kilograms
of separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium, urging
that NNWS recycle plutonium, and arguing for domestic recy-
cling as essential to the future nuclear energy.
President Carter recognized the problem, but the U.S.
bureaucracy continues to argue that the U.S. should be a
reliable supplier of nuclear services, equipment, and mater-
ial so as to be able to influence importers with safeguards.
The logic here is faulty as the Indian "peaceful nuclear ex-
periment so vividly illustrates. U.S. threats and sanctions
were not taken seriously by the Indian government and so they
grossly abused U.S. and Canadian help to acquire a nuclear
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capability. Besides, safeguards cannot be effectively
applied to fissile material only a few hours away from a
bomb.
Although safeguards cannot prevent a determined country
from developing nuclear weapons, they can help to deter it
and provide assurances to others that it has not done so.
Because of such positive features they should be pursued
at every opportunity.
Probably the most realistic approach to nuclear nonpro-
liferation is to tackle each nuclear candidate's energy and
security problems individually rather than through inter-
national conferences such as the INFCEP
.
3y discouraging or penalizing the dangerous forms of
nuclear energy that permit access to fissile materials while
encouraging the development of non-nuclear energy supplies
the U.S. can provide the necessary leadership to check
nuclear proliferation.
A credible U.S. deterrent force could also do wonders
to slow nuclear proliferation. Even the most adventurous
leaders of the world would not seriously contemplate attack-
ing its neighbor if it truly believed the U.S. would react
with force (not necessarily nuclear)
.
Generally speaking the major suppliers of nuclear tech-
nology are not serious about halting nuclear proliferation.
Stopping it costs something and up until now nobody is
seriously interested in paying the price.
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To ignore the problem or to pretend that "more may be
better," or to assume that these weapons must spread by some
sort of natural law, just as every weapon has, only insults
the very genius that created the "nuclear dilemma."
Under the present nonproliferation regime, civilian
nuclear energy programs assure that many new countries have
traveled a long distance down the path leading to a nuclear
weapons capability. The distance remaining will be shorter
and covered much more rapidly.
If fools and folly rule the world, the end of man in our
time may come as a rude shock, but it will no longer come





TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred
to as the "Parties to the Treaty",
Considering the devastation that would be visited upon
all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make
every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take
measures to safeguard the security of peoples,
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons
would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,
In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on
the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,
Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application
of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful
nuclear activities,
Expressing their support for research, development and
other efforts to further the application, within the frame-
work of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards
system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the
flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of
instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,
Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful
applications of nuclear technology, including any technologi-
cal by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States
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from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should
be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the
Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,
Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all
Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the
fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and
to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to,
the further development of the applications of atomic energy
for peaceful purposes,
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest pos-
sible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to
undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear
disarmament,
Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment
of this objective,
Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to
the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmos-
phere, in outer space and under water in its Preamble to
seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions
of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations
to this end,
Desiring to further the easing of international tension
and the strengthening of trust between States in order to
facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weap-
ons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and
the elimination from national aresenals of nuclear weapons
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and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on gen-
eral and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control,
Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, States must refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the terri-
torial integrity or political independence of any State, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations, and that the establishment and diversion for
armaments of the world's human and economic resources,
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes
not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weap-
ons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not
in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-
weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over
such weapons or explosive devices.
ARTICLE II
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty under-
takes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatso-
ever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices
or of control over such weapons or explosive devices
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directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture
of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
ARTICLE III
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty
undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agree-
ment to be negotiated and concluded with the International
Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the
International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safe-
guards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of
the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty
with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from
peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this ar-
ticle shall be followed with respect to source or special
fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed
or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any
such facility. The safeguards required by this article shall
be applied on all source or special fissionable material in
all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such
State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its
control anywhere.
2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to pro-
vide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b)
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equipment or material especially designed or prepared for
the processing, use or production of special fissionable
material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful pur-
poses, unless the source or special fissionable material
shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.
3. The safeguards required by this article shall be im-
plemented in a manner designed to comply with article IV of
this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or techno-
logical development of the Parties or international coopera-
tion in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including
the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment
for the processing, use or production of nuclear material
for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of
this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in
the Preamble of the Treaty.
4. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall
conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy
Agency to meet the requirements of this article either indi-
vidually or together with other States in accordance with
the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Nego-
tiation of such agreements shall commence within 180 days
from the original entry into force of this Treaty. For
States depositing their instruments of ratification or acces-
sion after the 180-day period, negotiation of such agree-
ments shall commence not later than the date of such deposit
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Such agreements shall enter into force not later than eight-
een months after the date of initiation of negotiations.
ARTICLE IV
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as
affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the
Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in
conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.
2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facili-
tate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest pos-
sible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and
technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall
also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other
States or international organizations to the further develop-
ment of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful pur-
poses, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon
States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the
neeeds of the developing areas of the world.
ARTICLE V
Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate
measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, un-
der appropriate international observation and through appro-
priate international procedures, potential benefits from any
peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made
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available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty
on a nondiscriminatory basis and that the charge to such Par-
ties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possi-
ble and exclude any charge for research and development.
Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able
to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international
agreement or agreements, through an appropriate internation-
al body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon
States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon
as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-
weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also ob-
tain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.
ARTICLE VI
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating
to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and
to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and com-




Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any groups
of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure





1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to
this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be
submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circu-
late it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if reques-
ted to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the
Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a confer-
ence, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the
Treaty, to consider such an amendment.
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a
majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, in-
cluding the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the
Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amend-
ment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors
of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment
shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its in-
strument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit
of such instruments of ratification by a majority of all the
Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all
nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Par-
ties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are mem-
bers of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic
Energy Agency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for
any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratifi-
cation of the amendment.
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3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty,
a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in
Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of
this Treaty with a view of assuring that the purposes of the
Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being real-
ized. At intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of
the Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by submitting a pro-
posal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the con-
vening of further conferences with the same objective of
reviewing the operation of the Treaty.
ARTICLE IX
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signa-
ture. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its
entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this arti-
cle may accede to it at any time.
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by sig-
natory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments
of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the
United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratifi-
cation by the States, the Governments of which are designated
Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory
to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of
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ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-
weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a
nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to
January 1, 1967.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or
accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force
of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the
deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all
signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature,
the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of
accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty,
and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a con-
ference or other notices.
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary
Governments pursuant to article 102 of the Charter of the
United Nations.
ARTICLE X
1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sover-
eignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it
decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject
matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme inter-
ests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdraw-
al to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United
Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such
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notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events
it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the
Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the
Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be ex-
tended for an additional fixed period or periods. This deci-
sion shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the
Treaty.
ARTICLE XI
This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and
Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be depos-
ited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly
certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the
Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory
and acceding States.
In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized,
have signed this Treaty.
Done in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London
















































































































































































+ Nuclear weapon state
** IAEA safeguards agreements in force as required by the
NPT
* IAEA safeguards agreements signed or approved by the
board of governors
o India has detonated a "peaceful nuclear device"
SOURCE: Nuclear Proliferation Factbook prepared by Envi-
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The following countries are those which appear
In Section II.
in the proliferation projections developed
For certain countries the overt emergence of particular pressures or reasons would depend upon
International and domestic changes vuch as are discussed in Secion II. Thus, some potential
pressures or reasons may well remain latent until. If ever, those changes occur.
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